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ABSTRACT
The electromagnetic pulse (EMP) effects produced by the detonation of a nuclear weapon
at high altitude are capable of causing widespread destruction in the U.S. homeland with
few to no immediate casualties. The threat of nuclear EMP attack against the United
States was recognized as probable during the Cold War but as time passed, the threat lost
consciousness among U.S. policy makers as other issues and threats rose to the forefront.
Simultaneously, the United States military and civilian society grew increasingly reliant
upon emerging electronic systems and capabilities while adversary nations and rogue
states rapidly pursued nuclear weapons capabilities. Today, the United States, as one of
the most highly developed nations on the globe, is reliant upon electronic systems for
almost every aspect of life, from communications to economics and security. As such, the
United States is highly vulnerable to attacks that affect these cornerstones of U.S. society
and global presence. The threat of a nuclear EMP attack against the United States today
and in the future is not only an effective option for both states and non-state actors, it is
an attractive one. Adversaries could derive great value from an attack that cripples the
U.S. ability to function at even the most basic levels. The threat of EMP attack is more
prescient in today’s modern warfare environment than ever before. As such, the United
States’ approach to nuclear deterrence and escalation control must evolve to fully
encompass the threat of nuclear EMP by both state and non-state actors.
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INTRODUCTION
The end of the Cold War marked, for many, an end to the prominence of nuclear
weapons. While Russia and the United States kept large numbers in their arsenals, the
focus on nuclear weapons shifted from buildup to reduction and the role of nuclear
weapons in U.S. national security strategy was greatly reduced. The United States largely
breathed a sigh of relief and shifted focus to domestic issues, other regions of the globe
such as Asia and, following September 11, 2001, long-term regional conflicts.
Simultaneously, proliferation quietly continued in states across the globe. China built up
its nuclear capabilities, Iran and North Korea further pursued nuclear weapons programs
of their own, India and Pakistan competed in the nuclear realm and Russia continued to
modernize and implement nuclear deterrence strategies for a multi-polar world. Terrorist
organizations like al Qaeda stated their intentions to gain access to weapons of mass
destruction (WMD) and the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) grew in strength,
number and territory, also stating intentions to use WMD if successfully acquired. As the
multi-polarity and variety of threats grew, nuclear weapons largely became, from a U.S.
point of view, a weapon of a bygone era with limited scope and purpose. For other states
and non-state actors, however, nuclear weapons remained the pinnacle of military
achievement, a guarantor of safety and security in a world dominated by conventionally
superior powers like the United States.
As the global security environment grew increasingly complicated, the technology
environment blossomed. Electronic systems, internet connectivity, global positioning
systems (GPS), energy and communications technology improved by leaps and bounds.
The United States became increasingly reliant upon electronic systems for everything
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from personal communication to banking to commercial travel to healthcare. Throughout
the 1970’s, the U.S. military executed the second offset strategy, investing in the
technological advancements that would provide the military with capabilities like
extended-range precision guided munitions, stealth aircraft and advanced C4ISR1, all of
which enabled the strategies of the United States throughout the Cold War and post-Cold
War eras. Today, 99 percent of the electricity U.S. military bases use comes from the
civilian electrical grid2. Advanced U.S. military systems depend on electronic systems’
interaction with satellites to target, communicate and travel. These capabilities make the
United States a leader in both commercial and military technology, however they also
create a significant vulnerability. If the United States experienced widespread electronic
disruption or failure, the effects would be felt in every aspect of civilian and military life.
A catastrophic failure of electronic systems would impact the ability of emergency
services to respond to crisis, running water and access to food over the long term would
be threatened, communication made extremely difficult, if not impossible in the
immediate aftermath, and the ability of the U.S. military to respond in any meaningful
way, both at home and abroad, severely hampered. While this seems in many ways like
science fiction, the capability exists to cripple the United States’ ability to function at
even the most basic level – and it has existed since the first nuclear weapon was
detonated, more than 70 years ago.
The use of electromagnetic pulse (EMP) as a weapon is a long-held concept of warfare,
especially among U.S. adversaries who have held the capability for decades. During the
Cold War, the main concern about EMP emanated from the Soviet strategy to cripple or
extinguish the ability of the United States to retaliate before a second strike on the U.S.
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homeland could be initiated, in the form of a high-altitude nuclear detonation over the
United States resulting in widespread EMP. However, this notion was largely rejected as
a strategy because many theorists of nuclear deterrence believed that the risk was not
worth the reward for the Soviet Union. If EMP worked as demonstrated in the nuclear
tests of the 1960’s, it was a suicide mission. Based on the deterrence strategy of the time,
the United States would undoubtedly respond in kind, all but guaranteeing an
overwhelming nuclear attack on Soviet territory. The stakes during the Cold War were far
too high and both sides relied so heavily on the theory of mutually assured destruction
that the idea of using a nuclear weapon for gaining the upper hand, however briefly, in
what would ultimately be a nation-ending war was not plausible, nor attractive. Today,
however, the world is very different. Nuclear weapons are possessed by nine states
instead of two, all with varying interests and strategic goals and quite different views on
the implementation of nuclear weapons as a tool of war in the 21st century. Additionally,
rogue states and non-state actors are potentially capable of launching their own nuclear
attacks if not now, then in the foreseeable future.
The risk and reward calculus has changed dramatically for U.S. adversaries who
seek to achieve strategic effects against the United States, in turn altering the deterrence
and escalation calculus. An adversary may choose to employ nuclear EMP in theater,
rather than over the U.S. homeland, rendering U.S. forces abroad incapable of responding
to regional or allied crises. The risk of a nuclear EMP attack against the United States
remains unlikely in comparison to smaller scale terror attacks or other security events but
the consequences of such an attack, if not prevented or deterred, would be catastrophic.
Yet, while any employment of a nuclear weapon would be viewed by the United States as
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extremely escalatory and would provoke a serious U.S. response, it is unclear that that
response would be nuclear. The United States possesses the ability to hold at risk high
value targets with capabilities other than nuclear weapons, options such as cyber, which
very well may be considered proportional as a response. High-altitude nuclear
detonations cause widespread electrical and infrastructure damage, but they rarely result
in immediate human casualties. Nuclear EMP can also be difficult to attribute, much like
large-scale cyber-attacks. These factors may very well complicate the U.S. response
calculus.
This thesis examines the level of threat a nuclear EMP attack on the U.S.
homeland or in theater represents in the 21st century modern warfare environment and
analyzes the effect a threat of nuclear EMP has on deterrence and escalation. The first
chapter provides an eagle eye view of the international security environment through the
year 2040 to give context to the issue and remove nuclear EMP from its traditional Cold
War boundaries. The second chapter identifies how the United States understands the
conduct of modern warfare and establishes current U.S. deterrence and employment
policy regarding nuclear weapons. The second chapter will also explore how key U.S.
adversaries Russia and China are approaching modern warfare and nuclear deterrence in
the 21st century and introduce how nuclear EMP complicates that environment. The third
chapter quickly summarizes the history of nuclear EMP, describes the effects of an EMP
attack versus the effects of a “traditional” employment of a nuclear weapon and
introduces the historical views of the Soviet Union on EMP attacks during the Cold War.
The fourth chapter is a case study of the 2003 Northeast blackout, analyzing the effects of
the blackout on the civilian infrastructure and ability of the city to respond and recover.
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The level of effect from the blackout is then compared to the estimated effect from
nuclear EMP employment and identifies the implications for U.S. national security
domestically and abroad. The fifth chapter explores the utility of nuclear EMP for both
state and non-state actors and identifies the motivating factors for employing nuclear
EMP. This chapter will also explore the strategy of employing nuclear EMP as part of a
larger asymmetric warfare strategy. Finally, the sixth chapter explores the relationship
between nuclear EMP and deterrence through analyzing how the employment of a
nuclear weapon to produce EMP effects may change how the United States thinks about
deterrence in the 21st century and identifying what policy options are available to the
United States in defining a deterrence strategy specifically designed to prevent a nuclear
EMP attack. Ultimately, the thesis will conclude with an identification of how likely it is
that nuclear EMP is to be used in the modern warfare environment, evaluate the level of
threat to the United States at home and abroad and identify recommendations for the
United States to best address the threat as it exists in the 21st century.
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DEFINITIONS
Nuclear Employment
There is an ongoing debate over the term nuclear “use” and, depending on the
community, “use” can mean multiple things. For some, it means the detonation of a
nuclear weapon in the context of a conflict. For others, it means the use of nuclear
weapons as a political or deterrent tool. Former Defense Secretary James Schlesinger
famously remarked, “We use nuclear weapons every day to deter our potential foes and
provide reassurance to the allies to whom we offer protection”3. The author of this thesis
tends to agree with Secretary Schlesinger, that nuclear weapons are indeed in use every
day as guarantors of security. As such, “nuclear use” will not appear as a package term in
this thesis so as to avoid confusion. Instead, “employment” will be used as a defining
term for the detonation of a nuclear weapon in the context of active conflict or attack
(testing excluded).
Electromagnetic Pulse
Electromagnetic pulse is a short burst of electromagnetic energy that, if strong enough,
can disrupt or destroy electrical components but is not of direct harm to human beings.
EMP can occur naturally, such as an effect of a strong geothermal storm or lightning
strikes. There are weapons that exist solely for creating EMP effect, though those are not
covered in this analysis. The EMP produced by a high-altitude nuclear detonation is
much stronger and more widespread than any other manmade EMP occurrence,
comparable only to a geothermal storm that directly affects Earth’s atmosphere. Highaltitude nuclear weapon detonations produce EMP in three waves as defined below4:
1) E1: An initial energy shockwave that is brief, about 1 microsecond. A
pulse of energy, similar to extremely strong static electricity, traveling at
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90% the speed of light, capable of destroying computers and other
electronic devices in line of sight of the detonation.
2) E2: An intermediate pulse with a very similar effect as a lightning strike,
unlikely to do damage to electronics or electrical systems already
protected against surges from lightning strikes. However, most systems
will be initially damaged from E1 and would likely experience additional
damage if the protection systems went down in the initial E1 surge.
3) E3: A long-lasting magnetohydrodynamic (MHD) signal, a much slower
pulse that travels through the magnetic field of the Earth, disrupting or in
many cases, destroying power lines, electrical transformers and power
plants. MHD occurs in two phases: Blast (distortion of the Earth’s
magnetic field lines by the expanding fireball) and Heave (heating and
ionization of a patch of atmosphere directly below the detonation that rises
and distorts the Earth’s magnetic field)5. E3 only occurs in high yield
detonations.
Asymmetric Warfare
Asymmetric warfare is typically defined as a conflict between actors that have
significantly disparate levels of capability and as such, the conduct of warfare is
unconventional. Asymmetric warfare can consist of guerilla tactics, information
campaigns, cyber-attacks, WMD attacks, escalation of regional conflicts, conducted
through engagement in proxy wars, or any combination of the aforementioned tactics. It
is common that asymmetric warfare includes multiple unconventional tactics as part of an
overall strategy. Attacks like 9/11 or the Sony hack by North Korea are often cited as
examples of asymmetric warfare. This kind of warfare is becoming increasingly common
in the 21st century as the relative military power of states becomes more and more
disparate but access to lethal or disruptive technologies becomes easier. As is discussed
further in this thesis, asymmetric warfare will become the norm for threat and conflict in
the 21st century security environment. State actors will increasingly engage in asymmetric
behavior as technologies proliferate and the security environment becomes more
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crowded. Employment of devastating cyber-attacks, nuclear weapons or other WMD to
create strategic effects in this environment are referred to as strategic asymmetric
capabilities.
Rogue State
Rogue states are often ruled by autocratic regimes and generally hostile towards the
United States. They often seek WMD capabilities, suppress or violate human rights and
disrupt regional security. They can be sponsors or partners in terrorism as well. For the
sake of this paper, when rogue states are mentioned or analyzed it is typically in reference
to Iran or North Korea. Though these two countries are very different, they are the two
most often labeled “rogue states”. Iran’s suppression of human rights, record of financing
or otherwise state-sponsoring terrorist organizations and secret but diligent pursuit of
nuclear weapons makes it an ideal, if nuanced, example of a rogue state. North Korea is
more obviously a rogue state based on its isolation from the global order, violations of
human rights and explicit and determined focus on developing a nuclear weapons
program. These two rogue states will be focused upon heavily in this thesis as actors
capable of and willing to employ nuclear EMP, especially in theater.
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RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
The research for this thesis took several routes: technology, history and policy oriented.
In order to best understand the motivations behind a state or non-state actor’s decision to
employ a nuclear weapon to achieve EMP effects, the author first needed to gain an
understanding and appreciation for the effects of EMP and how they are produced. This
consisted of reading through scientific journals and congressional testimony about
electrical pulses (natural and man-made), solar storms and nuclear physics. Next, the
author studied the 2003 Northeast blackout, not only to gain an understanding for the
case study but to better understand the vulnerabilities inherent to electrical systems and
the civilian infrastructure as a whole. Finally, in terms of technical research, the author
had to understand what was needed to successfully employ a nuclear weapon capable of
producing EMP effects. For example, it was essential to understand that high-altitude
nuclear detonations, meaning at least 30km or more above the Earth’s surface, are the
most effective for producing EMP effects over a wide area. The technologies required to
achieve a high-altitude detonation of a nuclear weapon are more intricate than a crude
nuclear device and a missile.
For the greatest probability of success, the actor would likely acquire ballistic
missile capabilities (short- or long-range and in some cases, intercontinental), a
miniaturized nuclear weapon capable of being fitted to the ballistic missile and a physics
package capable of withstanding the force of missile launch. However, the capabilities
required for employment of nuclear EMP are not as complex as those needed for ground
burst nuclear attack. For example, re-entry technology is not necessarily required. The
complexity of the challenge was incredibly important to take into account when
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contemplating the decision calculus of actors possibly looking to employ this capability
against the United States or its forward-deployed forces in theater.
There is no credible basis to an analysis about a future threat without first understanding
the historical basis from which the threat emerged. The methodology on historical
context involved in-depth research about nuclear testing, specifically focusing on the
Starfish Prime test, the first U.S. nuclear weapons test that exhibited EMP effects as far
as 1,000 miles away. It was in this test that nuclear EMP began to emerge as a possible
weapon in and of itself. The author also looked into Soviet nuclear weapons testing that
exhibited EMP effects as well.
As time progressed, Congress and policy makers became increasingly concerned
about the threat, causing Congress to establish the Commission to Assess the Threat to
the United States from Electromagnetic Pulse Attack in 2001. The reports from this
commission serve as the basis for the historical context of U.S. policy on the issue and as
the cornerstone for establishing credibility about the level of threat facing the United
States today and in the future. They also provide valuable information about the state of
U.S. infrastructure and its ability to withstand (or not) the effects of nuclear EMP. The
commission’s report on U.S. critical infrastructure also serves the purpose of framing the
arguments for adversarial use against the United States as it identifies key vulnerabilities
and the effects of those vulnerabilities being realized through a devastating natural
disaster, cyber or nuclear EMP attack. The Commission reports were especially eyeopening in terms of nuclear EMP as part of a larger asymmetric strategy. This becomes
important in the analysis of deterrence and escalation decision making later on in the
discussion.
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Finally, the author needed to understand the policies enacted by the United States as well
as potential adversaries on the subject of nuclear EMP, namely in the form of nuclear
declaratory policies or national statements on the matter, many of which have been
analyzed by U.S. experts. Russia and China are relatively clear about their broader
nuclear policies though there is by nature some ambiguity involved in those as well. The
challenge here was to try to identify the policies or doctrines, if such terms are even
applicable, to rogue states or non-state actors. Terrorist organizations are by nature more
declaratory than perhaps their capabilities can support but the history of their actions and
stated goals give hints as to how they may choose to employ nuclear EMP – or perhaps
why they would not. Rogue states are somewhat more formal in their statements but even
in those instances, the sincerity of their claims can often be disputed. The secretive nature
of rogue states and the actions they take make predictions of their future actions much
more difficult to ascertain, though their intended goals are in some ways easier to identify
than that of state actors. It was key to the analysis to make these distinctions as they
become important when exploring the possible approaches to deterrence.
This paper will explore all sides to the question of the level of threat represented by
nuclear EMP. The community debating this question has often been split into two camps:
the side that believes that this threat is unrealistic or so unlikely that is hardly worth
preparing to defend against, much less produce deterrence strategies designed specifically
for the threat, and the side that believes the threat is quite real and without preparing for it
or strategizing to prevent it, the United States is turning a blind eye to an existential
threat. This paper aims to remain somewhere in the middle while exploring the virtues
and misgivings of each side but will, in the end, come to a conclusion about the level of

11

threat nuclear EMP presents to the United States and its citizens. In order to do so, the
author makes several assumptions upfront about the security environment, the role of the
United States in the world and the role of nuclear weapons in U.S. defense strategy.
It is the assumption of the author that the security environment the United States will face
through 2040 will be one of increasing complexity and instability. This theme will be
further explored within the following sections but it is fundamental to understanding the
approach to analysis found herein. If the world were in fact to become more peaceful,
perhaps through the eradication of terrorism or a more balanced global order, the need for
this analysis may not exist at all. However, it is in the belief of the author that the security
environment is more likely to deteriorate in coming decades than stabilize that the
motivation for exploring this subject in-depth is rooted.
Similarly, it is the assumption of the author that the United States will not shrink
from the world stage but will continue to be a conventionally superior global actor with
global interests. Globalization as a trend is assumed to continue due to communication
and technological innovation and as a leading contributor to technological change, the
United States is unlikely to become isolated, much less remain so. As such, U.S. interests
and allied relationships will remain, meaning the United States will continue to be an
actor both respected and feared. Threats from outside U.S. borders, it is assumed, will not
dissipate but remain or grow.
Finally, the author assumes that nuclear weapons will continue to be a cornerstone
of U.S. defense policy and strategy. No assumptions are made about the numbers of
nuclear weapons the United States may retain or if the numbers will grow, only that the
United States will not reduce to zero. The makeup of the nuclear arsenal – whether it
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remains a triad or not – is also irrelevant to evaluating this threat. Though the force
structure may matter to some aspects of formulating deterrence policy, it has little effect
on the analysis of whether an actor will choose to use nuclear EMP against the United
States or not. Retaliation with nuclear weapons is retaliation regardless of whether the
weapon is launched from air, land or sea.
Throughout the research for this paper the author experienced several challenges.
The arguments surrounding this threat are somewhat passionate and can feel very much
like a conversation about science fiction at times. They also tend to be rather extreme in
some cases – borderline fear mongering on one side and tacit dismissal on the other.
While this is telling in terms of how split the community is on this issue, it also presented
a challenge to finding sources that looked at the issue in a balanced and sober manner.
The Congressional commission reports are the best sources in terms of a practical yet
serious examination of the threat but they are, at this date, somewhat aged6. Old sources
are a common problem when it comes to questions of nuclear weapons, though sources
on deterrence and its practice are much more recent and modern.
With that in mind, the author looked to three main pools of sources: official
government sources which assessed the threat and the technical and physical effects on
the United States, the debates of the community on the validity of the threat one way or
the other and both classic and modern approaches to nuclear deterrence, many of which
do not make mention of nuclear EMP but are the best representation of current deterrence
thinking and strategy. Through the combined analysis of these three pools of sources, the
author was able to come to conclusions about both the level of threat and how it affects
traditional approaches to nuclear deterrence and escalation.
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CHAPTER 1: THE FUTURE SECURITY ENVIRONMENT TO 2040
The security environment is the driving force behind any threat to the United
States and will shape U.S. force structure, posture and policy. The security environment
through 2040 will exhibit several trends key to understanding the environment in which
the threat of EMP may emanate: technological innovation, proliferation of WMD and
shifts in regional power dynamics. Combined, these factors will challenging the primacy
of the United States as a military actor on the global stage. As economic growth
strengthens East Asia over time, the West may struggle to remain influential. This
chapter will explore these trends in greater detail over the course of three periods of time7
and identify the context for the threat of nuclear EMP and the actors who will likely
acquire the capability to employ nuclear weapons with an intent of EMP effects.

2017-2025
The next eight years are likely to feature many of the same threats facing the
United States today, though some will evolve. The threat of high end peer-to-peer
competition or conflict with states such as Russia and China is likely to rise as both states
continue to invest heavily in both traditional and hybrid warfare capabilities8.
Investments in cyber and C4ISR capabilities and increasing numbers of unmanned and
undersea platforms would complicate and already complex operating environment. The
military modernization of Russian forces will likely enable continued open challenges to
U.S. and NATO security, much like the activities undertaken in Crimea, Ukraine in 2013.
Chinese economic growth will enable their ability to bolster military modernization9 and
provide a platform for continued buildup in the South China Sea, contributing to rising
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regional tensions. The United States will likely continue to monitor the competitive
balance of power in the Middle East, shaped by the conflicts in Syria and Afghanistan.
Unconventional warfare tactics and capabilities will begin to emerge more
frequently10 as rogue states and non-state actors continue to acquire, expand and improve
nuclear, chemical and biological weapons programs, coordinated and sophisticated
intelligence/espionage campaigns, mine and swarming capabilities and autonomous and
deep learning machines. The importance of nuclear weapons in the defense strategies of
the United States, Russia, China, and NATO is likely to rise as developing nuclear
weapons programs in North Korea (and, potentially Iran) accelerate11 and regional
tensions grow. Health programs designed to defend against chemical and biological
attacks will likely seek increased funding as a result of the increased threat of WMD
employment by non-state actors, much like has been witnessed in Syria. Global
insurgency by non-state and/or state-sponsored terror organizations, such as Al-Qaeda
and ISIL, is likely to influence targeted countries to increasingly adopt defensive stances
and focus on security operations at home, including tightening immigration controls.
Simultaneously, terror attacks, both lone-wolf and organized, are likely to grow in
frequency and intensity12 as counter-terror operations and strategies are implemented and
terror organizations are challenged in key regions.
As technological advances continue over the next eight years, unmanned and
autonomous, deep learning machines will likely see widespread adoption in both defense
and commercial markets. As unmanned technology becomes increasingly salient across
societies and militaries, “physical conflict could occur between unmanned systems. The
opportunities for bloodless attacks could lower the threshold for conflict”13. China’s
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technological adoption may rival that of the United States and could very well match the
U.S. ability to project power regionally and globally. Russia’s military modernization,
scheduled to be complete by the mid-2020’s14, includes fleets of modernized fixed-wing
aircraft (about 700 aircraft in total), new Borei-class ballistic missile submarines, and
improvements in ballistic missile technology; all of which could pose regional and global
threats to the United States and its allies.
Geopolitical movements, such as populism and isolationism, are likely to spread
due to diverging security priorities, economic disparities and demographic diversity,
especially across Western and Eastern Europe, prompting even more draconian
immigration regulations and impacting economic and allied relationships. While this
trend may slow or reverse within 4-8 years, the effects are likely to last for much longer.
International institutions such as NATO and the EU will adapt to the change more slowly
and it may take years for a stable rhythm to develop again. Policies emerging from these
movements may prove so extreme that domestic movements against isolationism pick up
momentum, the backlash against them may be more immediate and the West may see a
rapid return to more liberal policies and a re-engagement with globalization, aiding in the
share of emerging technologies and security cooperation.
In order to meet the complex and overlapping challenges of this time period, the
United States and its partners will likely look to develop forces that can rapidly and
adaptively face a broad range of threats, across varying regions and within multiple
domains. In the current zeitgeist, the United States may more critically assess the costs
and benefits of direct intervention in foreign conflicts, thought it will likely still have to
deploy forces to address a major crisis at some point while simultaneously managing
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ongoing lower-level conflicts. The ability of the United States to credibly deter and if
called upon, decisively defeat enemies and defend interests will very likely be tested over
the next eight years.

2025-2033
By 2030, the world could look significantly different than it does today. There are
several trends occurring now that will hit their peak in the 2025-2033 timeframe15,
including economic growth in Asia, shift in power among traditional hegemons and
changes in the nature of power and governance. While these trends are subject to some
wax and wane, it is likely that the main threats facing the United States will emanate
from the culmination of these major shifts in the security environment and that some risk
factors seen in the previous timeframe will come to fruition in this period.
The projected growth of Asian economies is projected to overtake that of North
America and Europe by 2030 in terms of GDP, population size, military spending and
technical investment16. In doing so, the shift in the balance of power is likely to
dramatically shift towards countries like China and India, whose existing relationships
with countries such as Brazil, South Africa and Turkey will in turn raise their global
presence. While the economies of the United States, Europe and Russia will not collapse
in any dramatic fashion, their relative declines will be further exacerbated by strong
growth in other regions. Influence, as a result, may wane. As these countries grow in
economic strength, so will their ability to pursue technological advancements and 21st
century manufacturing.
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Climate change consequences are projected to significantly worsen in terms of
increased occurrences of extreme weather events, more extreme droughts in dry areas and
significant and frequent flooding in wet areas. The Middle East, Northern Africa,
Western Central Asia, Southern Europe, Southern Africa and the Southwest United States
will be the most impacted by drought while coastal urban cities will face challenges with
extreme weather resulting in coastal flooding and threats from storm wave damage. There
is a possibility that extreme coastal weather will begin to drive coastal urban cities to
expand inland, stressing agricultural areas needed to support urban populations and
causing tensions among neighboring nations searching for area to expand. Resource
demands will likely become a centerpiece of international tensions, creating opportunity
for increased risk of state-to-state conflicts17.
Technological breakthroughs will become more frequent and significant and
public access to disruptive and potentially lethal technologies (precision-strike, cyber,
chemical/biological terror, artificial intelligence) will become easier. As processing
power and data storage becomes faster, easier and less expensive, governments and
societies will be faced with the challenge of preventing the commoditization of classified
military technology to non-state actors and individuals. These developments will likely
change the face of terrorism, the beginnings of which were seen in the previous era (use
of social media for propaganda and recruiting, drone warfare, etc.)18.
As the international system becomes more fragmented by shifts in power and
traditional means of cooperation are challenged, competition and conflict become more
likely. It is unlikely, however, that devastating great power conflict (on the level of WWI
or WWII) would take place, as the costs would be too high and the technology of the day
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would increase the speed, discernment and precision of kinetic and non-kinetic effects
necessary for state actors to achieve objectives, thereby reducing the magnitude of
conflict as they affect civilian societies. However, the risk of conducting high-level
conflicts with significant weaponry may rise. The proliferation of WMD is likely
throughout this period and regional instability will only fuel desire for states to produce
their own deterrent. As the risk for these types of conflict rises, so too does the risk of
nuclear, chemical or biological employment in asymmetric ways.
The role of the United States in this period is an uncertainty. If the U.S. economy
remains relatively strong, the U.S. presence on the world stage will not decline
significantly, barring any extreme policies that call for U.S. isolationism on a grand scale.
U.S. innovation both commercially and militarily will likely continue but will face
competition abroad. If the U.S. maintains its allied relationships, security cooperation
with the West is likely to continue. The U.S. role in Asia will continue to be challenged
and very well may be curtailed by a risen China. U.S. military forces will remain preeminent in their training and ability to conduct warfare but will face challenges in terms
of threats by proliferating technologies. U.S. force structure will likely need to be as, if
not more, flexible as in the previous period and much more technologically capable.
Nuclear weapons will likely remain a cornerstone of U.S. security and the improvement
of missile defense capabilities is likely, as naval and air capabilities will provide the
lion’s share of the projection of U.S. power.

2033-2040
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The world in this time period is unlikely to be more stable or peaceful and will
almost certainly be characterized by instability19. The United States will likely remain the
pre-eminent military power but will struggle to remain a leader politically and
economically. While the continued rise of Asian countries, like China, is not a guarantee,
intense competition between major powers, especially over resources, is highly likely.
The convergence of globalization, population and emergence of new ideologies and
proliferation of WMD is likely to create an environment in which conflict and
confrontation, especially at lower levels, is a common occurrence.
Perhaps the biggest threat facing this period is the proliferation of WMD. Not
only will proliferation generate instability and shift the global balance of military power,
terror groups are more likely to acquire and use nuclear, chemical and biological
materials in significant payloads20. Increasing cyber capabilities “directed at critical
infrastructures, including space assets”21, complicate this threat picture. As these
technologies and materials spread, the United States and partner nations will have a
harder time developing successful deterrence policies and strategies. Terror groups are
unlikely to hesitate to use devastating WMD capabilities if acquired. As states and nonstate actors continue to clash in this period, it is highly likely that those conflicts will
exhibit combined capabilities, including WMD, conventional, irregular and high-end
asymmetric capabilities.
The United States will face extended years of instability in an environment in
which the traditional balance of power is almost guaranteed to shift dramatically. As
such, the United States must be able to respond with both agility and flexibility while
maintaining strong commitments to U.S. interests, allies and friends. The United States
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must also be prepared to protect and defend innovation in both the military and
commercial realms in an attempt to remain the pre-eminent military power. U.S. force
structure will likely look drastically different by 2040 than it does today. Naval
capabilities, unmanned and autonomous technologies, superior air dominance, superior
cyber and space capabilities will own the military battlespace.
State-sponsored terrorism is likely to continue or even rise as regional conflicts
become more concentrated and frequent. In this event, the likelihood of a non-state actor
or terrorist organization acquiring WMD, as well as the expertise and technological
knowledge to employ it, may rise dramatically. While the employment of nuclear
weapons on a large scale remains unlikely, the employment of one or two in isolated
fashion is well within the realm of possibility. Analysts believe that conflicts in this era
are likely to include multiple forms of warfare with an increased risk of nuclear
employment22. The risk for nuclear employment to create EMP effects is higher in this
era as “countries with nuclear weapons could be tempted to explode a nuclear device to
wipe out their opponent’s ability to maintain connectivity…In this instance, nuclear first
use would not be used to harm humans as much as to deny opponents use of electronic
systems. Space, ocean and near coastal bottlenecks could be areas of nuclear use with
little human collateral damage”23.
The United States will be forced to confront an emerging threat environment
“characterized by a wide-spectrum of actors that include near-peers, established nuclear
powers, rogue nations, sub-national groups and terrorist organizations that now have
access to nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles or may have such access over the next 15

22

years” and will have the capability to “place the risk of EMP attack and adverse
consequences on the U.S. to a level that is not acceptable”24.

23

CHAPTER 2: U.S. EXPECTATIONS FOR NUCLEAR DETERRENCE AND
EMPLOYMENT WITHIN MODERN WARFARE
The role of nuclear weapons has changed decade to decade and over time their
role has been reduced dramatically. From the height of the Cold War, when nuclear
weapons represented the bulk of U.S. security, to today where nuclear weapons have a
reduced role as a matter of policy. In 2009, at the beginning of the Obama administration,
the President gave a speech in Prague outlining his administration’s views of nuclear
weapons policy and efforts to begin to bring about a world without nuclear weapons. This
was the beginning of what many saw as a utopian approach to nuclear weapons, in spite
of the challenge of proliferation and modernizing nuclear weapons doctrines.
In the Prague speech, the President vowed to press the Senate to ratify the
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, reduce the role of nuclear weapons in U.S. security
policy and strengthen nonproliferation regimes designed to curb the spread of nuclear
weapons technology and information, the most important of which being the
Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT)25. While nuclear weapons would remain the cornerstone
of U.S. security and power projection, their prominence would dwindle.
It was in the same speech that President Obama identified nuclear terrorism as a
real threat, stating “terrorists are determined to buy, build or steal one…We must ensure
that terrorists never acquire a nuclear weapon. This is the most immediate and extreme
threat to global security. One terrorist with a nuclear weapon could unleash massive
destruction”26. It is not clear if the threat of nuclear EMP was a consideration of the
Obama administration in classifying the threat of terrorist employment of a nuclear
weapon the most immediate and extreme threat to security. Nonetheless, terrorist
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employment of a nuclear weapon was at the forefront of both the administration and
security experts’ minds. However, nuclear weapons have not traditionally been used as a
deterrent for terrorist attacks in the past, mainly due to the high number of civilian
casualties that would ultimately result from the employment of a nuclear weapon against
the territory inhabited by a terrorist organization. As such, the decision to broadly reduce
the role of nuclear weapons in U.S. security policy is not entirely surprising.
For the remaining seven years of the Obama administration, the policy of a
reduced role for nuclear weapons continued. The President successfully negotiated the
New START treaty in 2010, enforcing new limits on nuclear warheads and missiles,
launchers and bombers. While there is nuance in those limits, the reductions were
significant and reflected an enduring desire to continue the traditions of arms control
following the end of the Cold War. The key provision in New START centered on the
freedom of both Russia and the United States to organize their nuclear force structures
however they wished, as long as they adhered to the limits imposed by the treaty. In
doing so, each state was free to create a force structure that best represented their
strategic goals. Today, the United States maintains a triad, emphasizing a capability to
support forward presence in allied nations and in maritime environments but has
struggled in recent years to provide sufficient funding for much-need modernization on
aspects of each leg of the triad. As budget pressures continue, the Trump Administration
will face challenges to funding expensive, existing programs like the Ohio-class
replacement submarines (recently named the Columbia-class) and the B-21 Long-Range
Strategic Bomber, while simultaneously awarding funding for new programs like the
Ground-Based Strategic Deterrent program (the Minuteman replacement) and the Long-
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Range Standoff Missile (LRSO). Key leaders in the Pentagon27 and Congress28 have
expressed commitment to funding these programs, as they are crucial to the credibility of
the U.S. nuclear deterrent, however with constrained defense budgets the fight over
funding and affordability will be fierce and is, as of yet, unsettled.
While the United States struggles to allocate the necessary funds for its nuclear
modernization, Russia’s significant and expensive nuclear modernization program,
expected to last through at least 2024, is well underway. The Russian Federation has
focused on phasing out Soviet-era systems and replacing them with more modern,
effective capabilities. The ICBM force structure will be completely modernized with
maximized warhead loads by 2021, the old Delta-class SSBNs will be replaced with eight
planned Borei-class SSBNs, and the nuclear-capable bomber fleet will feature a new subsonic, low-observable long-range bomber by the mid-2020’s29. The modernization of the
Russian nuclear arsenal points to the commitment they have in maintaining a nuclear
deterrent far into the future.
The Russians are fairly forthcoming about nuclear weapons strategy in their
military doctrine. While the United States generally separates nuclear policy from
broader military strategies in official documents, the Russians include their nuclear
doctrine as a vital component of the larger military strategy. In 2014, the Russian policy
regarding nuclear weapons read as follows:
“The Russian Federation shall reserve the right to use nuclear weapons in
response to the use of nuclear and other types of weapons of mass destruction
against it and/or its allies, as well as in the event of aggression against the Russian
Federation with the use of conventional weapons when the very existence of the
state is in jeopardy”30.
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This policy does not rule out first-use31 of nuclear weapons but frames the policy
within fairly tight parameters. Though the Obama administration explored transitioning to
a no-first-use policy in the last year of the administration, they ultimately decided against
doing so. Many experts in the field argued against it, citing concerns over possibly
undermining the deterrence strategy. Russian nuclear doctrine is much more belligerent
and prominent within the broader military strategy than that of the United States.
The Russian Federation has demonstrated a willingness to engage in asymmetric
warfare and is believed to include nuclear weapons within their asymmetric warfare
strategies. Even as the Russians scaled down their nuclear arsenal following the end of the
Cold War, they deliberately maintained the ability to employ nuclear EMP. Dr. Lowell
Wood, in his testimony before Congress on Russian nuclear strategy and EMP stated,
“EMP strike component exists today in the Russian strategic order-of-battle, moreover
likely at its maximum Cold War strength. I very confidently predict that it will be one of
the last features of Soviet strategic nuclear weaponry to be retired from the Russian
strategic force structure”32. It is highly unlikely that any Russian employment of nuclear
EMP would happen independent from other asymmetric warfare tactics such as “cyberattacks, sabotage, and kinetic attacks against the national electric grid and other critical
infrastructures – a decisive new way of warfare described by Russian experts as a
‘Revolution in Military Affairs’”33. Further analysis of the history of Russian EMP and its
potential asymmetric employment is explored further in following chapters.
While the United States has dealt with a nuclear Russia for decades, it must also
take into account younger nuclear powers (China, Iran, and North Korea) that pose
deterrence challenges to the United States and its allies. China’s nuclear program has
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been active since its first test in October 1964 and has consistently operated under a nofirst-use policy, asserting that the Chinese nuclear arsenal is a minimum deterrent against
nuclear attacks34. The U.S. State Department believes that China’s missile arsenal
includes short-range ballistic missiles, ICBMs, SLBMs and possibly cruise missiles, all
capable of carrying tactical nuclear warheads – and all capable of delivering nuclear
weapons to high-altitude to produce EMP effects.
Information about China’s nuclear arsenal is limited but its policies on no-firstuse and nuclear restraint are well documented. Chinese defense white papers consistently
reiterate China’s “unequivocal commitment that under no circumstances will it use or
threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon states or nuclear-weaponfree zones” and there is “no sign that China is going to change a policy it has wisely
adopted and persistently upheld for half a century”35. However, some experts believe that
China views the employment of nuclear weapons to produce EMP effects an
unconventional attack, rather than a strategic one, and therefore believes the United
States may not view such employment as crossing the nuclear threshold36. Like Russia,
China has also invested in asymmetric capabilities, such as cyber, and may view nuclear
EMP as a broader asymmetric warfare tool. Considering the regional tensions between
China and the United States, especially regarding Taiwan and the South China Sea, it is
far more likely that China would choose to employ nuclear EMP regionally in an attempt
to halt U.S. intervention, rather than over the U.S. homeland.
As rogue states, North Korea and Iran pose special challenges to the United States
in the modern warfare environment. Both have active nuclear weapons programs and
advancing missile capabilities that are more than capable of producing EMP effects
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regionally and may be capable of reaching the skies above the United States to produce
intended EMP effects. Both are also conventionally inferior to the United States and gain
little by engaging in a conventional conflict in which they are sure to be decisively
defeated. Asymmetric use of a nuclear weapon may not only provide states like Iran and
North Korea the upper hand, it may postpone or prevent a devastating U.S defeat
altogether.
North Korea has often stated its adversarial position towards the U.S. and though
Iran has cooperated with the United States on some nuclear weapons issues, the
relationship between the two remains tense and unstable. The nuclear agreement between
the United States and Iran, the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), went into
effect in January 2016, lifting nuclear-related sanctions on Iran. It requires that Iran
comply with all United Nations security resolutions regarding the Iranian missile
program. UN security resolution 2231 endorsed the JCPOA and “called upon” Iran to not
undertake any further action on the missile program (ballistic or cruise), including
launches, as well as endorsed previous security resolutions aimed at curbing Iranian
testing of missile technology37. However, Iran has tested missile technology as recently
as January 29, 2017, demonstrating an enduring desire to possess sophisticated missile
capabilities, the vast majority of which would be capable of delivering a nuclear payload
at high-altitude to produce EMP effects.
North Korea poses a slightly different challenge. It is extremely difficult to
ascertain exact numbers or facts about the status of North Korea’s nuclear program.
However, it is believed to be somewhat sophisticated, possibly including at least one
thermonuclear device. North Korea has conducted five tests of nuclear weapons in total
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and a far larger number of missile tests, though they have enjoyed mixed success.
Regardless, North Korea’s nuclear ambitions are only growing and they have been clear
about their intentions to target South Korea and the West Coast of the United States.
Even if targeting of the West Coast is not yet technically feasible, employment of a
nuclear weapon in theater would be devastating to U.S. forces and allies in the region and
would likely alter the regional balance of security permanently. To date, the United States
and South Korea have maintained deterrence in the region through security
demonstrations and exercises, however a nuclear EMP attack in theater may render these
types of operations incredibly difficult, if not impossible.
The nuclear security environment of today, from a U.S. perspective, largely
focuses on the threat from employment of nuclear weapons against the U.S. homeland,
U.S. forces in theater and U.S. allies and friends. However, it makes little-to-no mention
of asymmetric uses of nuclear weapons like that of nuclear EMP. Perhaps, this is due to
the fact that nuclear EMP fell out of public consciousness following the end of the Cold
War, or that more prescient threats became more urgent within the current security
environment, or perhaps that with an increasingly sophisticated technological
environment, the U.S. believes that an actor would not need to resort to the employment
of a nuclear weapon to produce effects similar to EMP. Whatever the answer, it is clear
that U.S. deterrence strategy is not focused on the threat of nuclear EMP by state
adversaries, rogue states or terrorist organizations but on more traditional nuclear
deterrence challenges.
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CHAPTER 3: NUCLEAR EMP – A HISTORICAL OVERVIEW
Nuclear electromagnetic pulse was, in many ways, an unexpected discovery. In
the early years of the Cold War, the United States and the Soviet Union were racing to
produce large arsenals of nuclear weapons and testing of those weapons was happening
frequently. In 1961 and 1962, both countries began to test nuclear weapons at highaltitude, during which they observed the first effects from the electromagnetic pulse
produced by the detonation of the weapon. Only a total of 20 high-altitude nuclear
weapons tests were conducted between the Soviet Union and the United States, during
which EMP effects were observed but not deliberately sought out38. The Soviet Union
conducted seven such nuclear weapons tests above their own territory of Kazakhstan
between 1961 and 1962, all of which demonstrated EMP effects such as observable
damage to transformers and collapsed critical electric infrastructure. The weapons tested
were mainly “low-yield warheads, at least one probably an Enhanced Radiation Warhead
that emitted large quantities of gamma rays that generate the E1 EMP electromagnetic
shockwave”39.
The most prominent of the U.S. high-altitude tests was in July 1962, named
“Starfish Prime”. The nuclear weapon was 1.45 megatons40 and was detonated at a height
of 400 kilometers above Johnston Atoll in the Northern Pacific Ocean. In Hawaii, almost
1,400 kilometers away, the “effects were bizarre and almost entirely unanticipated. One
effect was an electromagnetic pulse, but nobody knew it was going to be anywhere nearly
as large it proved to be. They had all this data and they didn’t understand very much of
it, including the EMPs that had been observed and the effects produced…all kinds of
electrical disturbances were seen over 1000 kilometers away in Oahu”41. The EMP
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produced by the detonation “interrupted radio broadcasts, caused streetlights to
malfunction and burglar alarms to sound and resulted in electronic failures across the
islands”42. The night sky above Hawaii lit up with thermonuclear glow and about one
third of the satellites in low-earth orbit were damaged or destroyed43. Figure 1
demonstrates the path of the EMP the further it travels from the site of detonation and
shows how altitude has a direct correlation with effect. Had Starfish Prime been
detonated at a lower altitude, the EMP effects would have covered a much smaller area
and likely would not have affected electrical systems in Hawaii at all.

Figure 1. EMP Range of the Starfish Prime Nuclear Test44
As these effects were observed in subsequent tests by both the United States and
the Soviet Union, the scientific nuances of producing the desired effects became clearer.
A high-yield nuclear weapon detonated between 40 and 500 kilometers above the earth’s
surface (exo-atmospheric) is by far the most effective. Ground-burst nuclear weapons
produce EMP at thousands of volts per meter but only over short distances. The other
effects of ground-burst nuclear detonations typically outweigh any EMP effects. Highaltitude nuclear detonations, however, produce extremely strong EMP over very wide
distances with no physical threat to humans from the fireball, fallout or blast effect. The
radiation produced from the burst will not interact with other atoms until they reach the
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top level of the atmosphere, causing them to excite and travel along the earth’s magnetic
field at an extremely accelerated rate over a vast area. Electromagnetic waves create
extremely high electric field strengths, producing thousands of volts in a split second
pulse, overwhelming electrical systems, especially unprotected equipment. The greater
the altitude, the more widespread the area effected and the greater the likelihood that lowearth orbit satellites experience interference or are damaged45.

Figure 2. Area Effected by EMP Determined by Height of Burst46
Two types of basic damage occur in electrical systems due to electromagnetic
pulse: physical damage, such as short-out and burning, requiring replacement or repair
and operational upset requiring reboot or full reset of the system47. This type of damage
was observed in civilian infrastructure, such as traffic lights and electricity to homes, and
communications infrastructure, such as radio broadcasts and telephone lines during both
the Johnston Atoll tests and the Soviet tests above Kazakhstan. Once affected, electrical
systems could take days to repair or months to replace. The Soviet Union, after
witnessing these types of effects in Kazakhstan, began to develop strategies that included
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the employment of nuclear EMP against the U.S. homeland, with the goal of
“paralyz[ing] our military systems, as well as civilian critical infrastructure. The Russians
were also hoping it would interfere with emergency action messages to all forces,
including ballistic nuke submarines”48.
The United States developed Cold War national capabilities, such as the GroundWave Emergency Network (GWEN)49, to protect communication networks from EMP
effects and worked to harden the nuclear weapons infrastructure in the event that the
Soviet Union would attempt to damage or destroy the United States’ ability to
communicate or respond to Soviet aggression. During the Cold War, it was assumed that
if nuclear EMP were to be employed, it would be done in an effort to cripple the ability
of the other to respond before a devastating second strike. However, because there were
so few high-altitude nuclear weapons tests and the numbers of nuclear weapons on each
side so high, there was no guarantee that an EMP attack could cripple the whole of one
side’s nuclear arsenal, and therefore not guarantee the prevention of a retaliatory strike. It
was also clear that any employment of a nuclear weapon would result in nuclear
retaliation, not just a ground- or air-burst. The deterrence that governed the battlespace of
the Cold War was fairly straight forward and understood by both sides. The guarantee of
mutual destruction combined with even a small doubt in the capability was strong enough
to prevent an EMP attack by either side.
However, even in the Post-Cold War environment, concerns over EMP remained
fresh in the minds of Russian strategic leadership. The Norwegian rocket launch incident
in 1995 was interpreted by the Russians as a U.S. SLBM launch designed to “take out the
general staff and paralyze the forces to enable a surprise attack. They would expect a
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single missile from a close location. This was a week after they lost the battle of Grozny.
They thought, if the roles were reversed and the U.S. military had suffered a defeat in the
Cold War, [the Russians] would complete the process and at some point deliver a coup de
grace against the United States…they were waiting to see if the U.S. would launch a
surprise nuclear attack to finish off Russia and finalize its Cold War victory” 50. While the
United States largely moved on from the Cold War and has, by all measures, thought of
nuclear EMP as a threat of that era ever since, the Russians have not. Scientists of the
Russian Federation have identified nuclear weapons as unique in their ability to create
widespread EMP. Efforts to create conventional weapons that have the same effects have
been challenging: “It is practically impossible for non-nuclear means to concentrate
energy that is in any way comparable with that of a nuclear burst”51. As Russian
asymmetric strategies of war developed and modernized to include cyber-attacks,
information campaigns and sabotage campaigns (small arms, bombs), the strategy for
employment of nuclear EMP evolved simultaneously. In 2004, Russian Major General
Vladimir Belous wrote the following in a public article:
“Space-based and ground facilities of the information-reconnaissance system,
without which the missile defense system will prove to be ‘blind, are
especially vulnerable in this sense [EMP]… ‘blinding’ of enemy territory by
disabling his electronic and power network is also possible. American
specialists determined that in case a large nuclear charger were detonated at an
altitude of hundreds of kilometers above the geographic center of the United
States, the State of Nebraska, a powerful electromagnetic pulse will disable
electronic and power systems on the territory of the entire country for a
certain time”52.
The same year, Russian Captain, First Rank, H. Rezyapov wrote an article entitled
“Asymmetric Threats to the National Security of the United States” in which he
postulated, “Such a blast would simultaneously take out of action almost all of the
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satellites orbiting above the United States… and affect up to 90 percent of the territory of
the United States by the action of its EMP”53. Russia has not ceased to incorporate
nuclear EMP into its strategy and finds great value in the capability outside of the Cold
War era.
The Post-Cold War world not only saw disparities in the way Russia and the
United States viewed nuclear weapons and their employment, it experienced significant
growth in the number of states which possess nuclear weapons. U.S. allies like the U.K.
and France, China, Pakistan, India, Iran and North Korea all became states capable of
devastating destruction through the use of nuclear weapons, and each state’s strategy for
those weapons differs depending on the security situation in which they operate. For the
purposes of this analysis, China, Iran and North Korea are the focus, though any of the
remaining states could employ nuclear weapons for EMP effect and greatly influence
their own strategic situations.
The U.S. Department of Defense reports that China has included nuclear EMP as
part of its larger asymmetric strategy since 1999, though has spent more time pursuing
conventional directed energy and electronic warfare weapons as well as exploring space
and counter-space capabilities, which it views as inevitable factors of future asymmetric
warfare54. Technical papers on EMP appear regularly in Chinese technical journals, such
as one published in a Chinese military digest in 2002, which stated “EMP warheads will
make it much easier to cross the nuclear threshold”55. The Taiwanese government, as a
possible target of nuclear EMP, has been writing about Chinese EMP capabilities since at
least 1992. One such report in October 2003, reported that “China is engaged in
quantitative production and deployment of EMP micro nuclear warheads”56. According
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to a Wall Street Journal article in the same year, “China recently published an article on
EMP in a Chinese-language technical journal. To make sure the U.S. got the message, the
article appeared in English’”57. Though China retains its commitment to a no-first-use
policy, it is clear that as the Chinese thinking on nuclear weapons employment has
shifted over time, especially in terms of the employment of a nuclear weapon for EMP
effects. In the eyes of Chinese defense strategists, nuclear EMP “will make it much easier
to cross the nuclear threshold”58.
Though Iran has not directly stated an intention to acquire EMP capabilities, it is
widely believed to be actively pursuing the capabilities needed as part of its nuclear and
missile programs. The JCPOA succeeded in slowing the Iranian nuclear program,
delaying it about a decade. However, the agreement has done little to slow the progress of
Iran’s missile program. Some experts believe that “the military utility of Iran’s ballistic
missiles is limited because of their poor accuracy”59 however, the capabilities required to
successfully employ nuclear EMP do not require accuracy, “it just has to go up. It's well
within the capability of even an earlier Scud missile, of which thousands have been
produced – it just has to have nuclear weapon on top”60. This does not require re-entry
capabilities or sophisticated targeting systems. Iran’s missile testing so far has
demonstrated their ability to launch “their versions of Scuds off of the Caspian Sea - not
from land, but from the sea - and launched them over land. And we’ve also seen them
launch missiles that have gone up and apparently exploded near their highest altitude –
when you put those two ideas together – that is an EMP attack”61. As a rogue state, Iran is
notoriously vague and secretive about its capabilities and intentions. It is difficult to
determine whether nuclear EMP is truly within the offensive strategies of Iran however,
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if desired, it would not be a technical stretch to accomplish. Finally, Iran’s history of
state-sponsored terrorism is especially troubling in terms of nuclear EMP and will be
explored and analyzed in further chapters in the context of the modern threat to the
United States.
North Korea, as previously analyzed, has tested nuclear weapons for over a
decade and is well aware of the ability to produce EMP effects, especially against U.S.
and allied forces in theater. South Korea has long been concerned about the threat of
nuclear EMP from North Korea and has published many articles in academic and security
journals concerning the threat to low-earth-orbit satellites above the region as well as the
risk of ensuing panic among U.S. forces in the region62 if or when damage is done to
forward-deployed U.S. capabilities. Though there is little data, much like Iran, to
concretely determine that nuclear EMP is among the capabilities North Korea is
attempting to acquire, recent rocket and missile tests into the Sea of Japan63 show that
North Korea may indeed be capable of inflicting nuclear harm or nuclear EMP in theater
on U.S. military assets in Japan or South Korea.
Nuclear weapons have changed little since the Cold War but the nature and
strategy of their employment, especially in terms of nuclear EMP has evolved. While
asymmetric warfare is not a new concept, the frequency with which it is undertaken and
the use of the capabilities it involves are purely modern. For many of the states discussed,
the employment of nuclear EMP is not thought of or strategized as a singular event, but
as part of a larger whole. To best understand why this is so and why states and non-state
actors may find nuclear EMP appealing, one must first understand the effects nuclear
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EMP would have on the United States, its infrastructure, military capabilities and
citizens.
Modern Day EMP Vulnerabilities
Older technology, such as the previously mentioned vacuum tubes of the 1960’s,
is “one million times less vulnerable”64 than today’s technology and effects were still
observed more than 1,400 kilometers away from the Starfish Prime detonation. To best
understand the utility of nuclear EMP, one must first understand the vulnerabilities
inherent in today’s electronically-dependent world. The United States has long been
known as an innovative nation, one which has experienced leaps and bounds of
technological advancement. Today, the United States is more technologically advanced
than ever before and electronics, telecommunication systems and electrical systems form
the cornerstones of a thriving U.S. society (transportation, banking, water and agricultural
production and dissemination, communications, etc). However, these critical
infrastructures within the United States are very poorly protected, not just from events
like nuclear EMP but also from natural disasters or terrorist attacks. These vulnerabilities
are well-known among adversaries and both invite and reward attacks like cyber,
sabotage and nuclear EMP; an adversarial “cheap shot”, if you will.
In 2001, the Commission to Assess the Electromagnetic Pulse Threat was
established to study the vulnerabilities of critical U.S. infrastructure systems to nuclear
EMP attack. The commission evaluated all aspects of U.S. infrastructure as they are
dependent upon one another to function in a meaningful way. What the commission
found was that this dependency created significant challenges for recovery after a nuclear
EMP attack. In 2008, the Commission again assessed the critical infrastructure of the
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United States and found it to be extremely vulnerable to the effects of nuclear EMP, in
such a way that any devastating attack is considered an existential threat to the United
States. Below are the elements of U.S. critical infrastructure and how each may be
affected by nuclear EMP.
Electrical Power
The U.S. electric grid is composed of networks of local electricity supplies, with
large-capacity electric transmission hubs few and far between. In such a setup, even small
upsets in the system can cause functional collapses and large disturbances like “EMPlevel effects could degrade or collapse 70 percent of the country’s electrical service in
one instant”65. The system is designed to withstand disturbances like lightning strikes, but
in limited areas, not overwhelming, instantaneous high-voltage pulses across vast swaths
of the country, which is why the infrastructure relies on a strategy of “islanding”.

Figure 3. U.S. Electrical Grid Interconnections66
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When a portion of the system is damaged or interrupted, the other islands continue to
operate based on geographic locations of the larger transmission hubs. However, in the
event of an EMP attack, numerous (if not all) islands would be degraded or destroyed
simultaneously. Though peripheral islands, if functioning, are capable of restarting those
in the immediate vicinity, the process would require restarts in rounds from the outside of
the damaged area, in. This process would take weeks, if not months, during which the
affected population would remain without power. The Commission report argued that
with the current setup, the only effective way to restart the system would be through
“black start generation”67: the process of using hydroelectric, geothermal and
independent diesel generators to restart the grid. These energy producers are not as
common in the U.S. system and the process would still take significant time. Another
complicating element is the overarching need for restart processes to take place. The
ability to repair and restart electrical power systems requires communication systems,
operational finance systems and transportation systems which need reliable, continuous
fuel supply. Fuel supply, communications, transportation and finance infrastructures will
all be affected in the event of a strong EMP attack. Restoring those systems is not only
essential to the ability to restore power but essential to the quick recovery of civilian
order.
Electricity is produced and distributed in various ways in the United States, some
more resilient to nuclear EMP than others. Coal-fired generation plants are generally the
most durable and normally have on-site fuel storage, so in the event of an emergency,
they can produce energy, if only for a short amount of time. Natural gas-fired turbines are
more modern and therefore more vulnerable. Nuclear plants, which represent 20% of the
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country’s electrical generation, have their own safe shut down systems that go into effect
in the event of system upsets – their ability to shut down safely is key during EMP but
they will be unavailable as generation sources for months following an EMP attack68.
Hydroelectric power is durable against EMP and produces significant generation but does
so unevenly in terms of its geographic availability. Hydroelectric power would be key in
recovering service for areas along the coast or dams of large rivers. Hydroelectric power
is likely the most helpful in a black start generation process because their geographic
locations allow restart to happen from the periphery of the grid.
Electrical power is the number one concern for loss during an EMP attack, as
numerous critical aspects of civilian life and the functioning of government at all levels
depend upon an operational power grid. A single EMP attack “may be strong enough to
seriously degrade or shut down a large part of the electric power grid in the geographic
area of EMP exposure effective instantaneously…Should significant parts of the electric
power infrastructure be lost for any substantial period of time, the Commission believes
that the consequences are likely to be catastrophic, and many people may ultimately die
for lack of the basic elements necessary to sustain life in dense urban and suburban
communities. In fact, the Commission is deeply concerned that such impacts are likely in
the event of an EMP attack unless practical steps are taken to provide protection for
critical elements of the electric system and for rapid restoration of electric power,
particularly to essential services”69. The good news is that protecting, or hardening, key
generation capabilities in strategic geographic locations within the system would be
enough to create a network capable of quick restart in the event of a devastating attack.
Hardening and protection of key capabilities also contributes to deterrence of an attack in
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the first place. If it becomes clear that the United States has taken significant steps to
protect critical infrastructure from damage or disruption, the risk v. reward calculus shifts
and an actor may not believe that an EMP attack would have the desired effects but still
prompt a U.S. response.
Telecommunications
The immediate aftermath of the attacks on September 11, 2001 best illustrate, on
a smaller scale, what may happen in the aftermath of an EMP attack in terms of the
disruption or loss of telecommunications networks. Personal telecommunications, the
vast majority over cell phone networks, were disrupted up and down the east coast simply
due to call volume which overwhelmed the system and caused cascading failures. Radio
communications between first responders were patchy and communication at ground zero
was confusing and incomplete. Perhaps the most alarming failure in communications
networks was at the federal level. According to the staff report of the September 11th
Commission, the Defense Department’s National Military Command Center initiated a
conference call about the ongoing situation but had trouble including the FAA, who had
information about the hijackings: “Operators worked feverishly to include the FAA in
this teleconference, but they had equipment problems and difficulty finding secure phone
numbers. NORAD asked three times before 10:03 to confirm the presence of FAA on the
conference, to provide an update on the hijackings. The FAA did not join the call until
10:17”70. By the time a complete picture of the hijackings was garnered through
information sharing of the FAA and DoD, the Pentagon had been attacked as well.
Though communications infrastructure was not directly targeted on September 11th, the
event highlighted difficulties and vulnerabilities within the telecommunications system as
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well as its connection to other aspects of the national security architecture. The
interruption in communications affected key financial markets and posed liquidity risks
for U.S. finances. Business continuity and financial stability are essential in the recovery
effort and are closely tied to U.S. national security. In the event of an EMP attack
targeted to destroy these systems, the results could be much more devastating and longlasting. Unprotected communication within the affected area would be impossible and
operational areas would be severely degraded due to overwhelming call volume.
Concerning federal communications, the Commission reports of 2004 and 2008
recommended that the federal government ensure the Government Emergency
Telecommunications System is operational and protected, as the four types of
communications within it are unique in their ability to withstanding EMP71. Wireline
communications are durable but may be degraded within the affected area; wireless
communications are likely to be destroyed and inoperable (unless they are powered down
at the time of attack); the radio communication sub-system is not widespread but where it
is connected to antennas, power lines and telephone lines it is highly vulnerable. Radio
communications not connected to those assets at the time of attack will likely be
operational; and low-earth orbit communications satellites may be degraded or inoperable
from radiation damage depending on the altitude and magnitude of the detonation72.
In April 2015, as part of the government’s effort to “safeguard the command’s
sensitive sensors and servers from a potential EMP attack”73, NORAD decided to move
critical assets, like servers, sensors and communications equipment, back into the bunker
at Cheyenne Mountain, Colorado, the Cold War cavern built in the 1960’s to safeguard
sensitive military communications and technology from a Soviet EMP attack. Raytheon
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was awarded a $700 million, 10-year contract to provide sustainment and maintenance
services to “help the military perform accurate, timely and unambiguous warning and
attack assessment of air, missile and space threats”74. The facility was closed down about
a decade ago after the military deemed the threat low enough to move the operations to
Peterson Air Force Base nearby. It is possible that this is a first step in protecting
sensitive communications as tensions with the Russians are once again on the rise.
Banking and Finance
The American economy, one of the largest and strongest in the world, depends
upon electrical systems to run effectively and globally. The financial services industry is
comprised of a network of systems that process instruments of monetary value (deposits,
loans, funds transfers, savings, etc.) through banks and depository institutions, including
the Federal Reserve, investment companies, and industry utilities such as the NYSE.
Without functioning electricity and computer systems, the industry would be crippled.
These are the means and resources that provide the U.S. population with the ability to
buy food, fuel and essential goods and services. Without it, the chances for chaos to erupt
in a short amount of time are very high. Of all the institutions affected by EMP, banking
and finance come second only to the electrical grid. There is a direct link between the
economic security of the nation and national security. The EMP Commission reports
identified the Department of Homeland Security, the Federal Reserve Board and the
Department of the Treasury as the agencies responsible for ensuring there are mitigation
tactics and recovery strategies in place for events like EMP75. Even if recovery takes
weeks, this is one sector which must recover fully.
Fuel and Energy Infrastructure
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The transport and dissemination of fuel and energy depends upon electronic
control systems, real-time data flows, communications and process control systems.
Operation of oil refineries and other fuel production technology requires an operational
electric system. In the aftermath of an EMP attack, lack of access to fuel further
exacerbates the challenge of restarting the electric grid and providing transportation to the
civilian population, who may be attempting to leave affected areas. Access to fuel also
impacts the ability of the government to respond to crises stemming from EMP attacks,
such as food and water shortages and medical emergencies.
Transportation
Transportation in the United States occurs in several forms: rail, road, water and
air. A nuclear EMP attack would affect all four of these, but in different ways.
Transportation services in the United States are increasingly reliant on information
technology and public information networks and disruption even at the local or regional
level can have national effects. The significant degradation of the transportation
infrastructure is likely in the immediate aftermath of an EMP attack76. This would include
wide-area gridlock (traffic light malfunctions, temporary or unrecoverable engine
shutdown), the cessation of rail transportation (lost communication with rail traffic
control), air traffic grounded (lost air traffic control) and port closures (commercial
power and cargo hauling capabilities inoperable).
There are mixed reports about the risk to airliners in flight during an EMP attack.
While it the effects of EMP on airliners has not been widely tested, it is believed that
more modern airline designs, such as the Boeing 777, may experience failure in flight in
the aftermath of EMP because of increased reliance on computerized technology in the
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newer models77. If this were to in fact occur, immediate deaths from EMP would climb
dramatically due to the number of airlines in flight over the United States at any given
time. In the aftermath of an EMP attack, the U.S. government and the FAA must find a
way for planes in flight to land safely, without an operable air traffic control. DHS and
the FAA will need to coordinate extended no-fly periods and perform assessments on the
air traffic control systems to determine how quickly it can be recovered78. While the
airline industry is not critical to the survival of the United States, the impact on civilian
life and economic health of the nation would be extreme and long-lasting.
Railroad transportation is designed to operate under high stress but they often
require ample warning time, in the case of severe weather, for example. There will be
little to no warning for an EMP attack, giving railroad operators no time to prepare for
delays, prioritize shipments and enhance safety. Long delays and disruption on railroads
would likely cause further disruption in the distribution of food, water and fuel during a
crucial time when the civilian population will be in need.
Similar to airliners, the effect of EMP on vehicles is debated. Newer model cars
with onboard computers are likely to be more affected than older models and cars
powered off at the time of the electromagnetic pulse are likely to be completely operable,
regardless of the technology inside. However, the impact of EMP on vehicles does not
just affect the mobility of civilians, it affects the transportation of vital resources like
food, water and emergency personnel. Without viable transportation, the ability of
distributors to get food out to grocery stores from regional warehouses would be severely
impacted. Grocery stores typically stock enough fresh food for three to five days while
warehouses stock about a month’s worth79. Panicked populations are likely to buy out
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grocery stores in the immediate aftermath of an EMP attack, adding to concerns about
food distribution and civil order. The Stafford Act80, an act passed to authorize the
President to ensure that emergency mass feeding and distribution is able to occur
efficiently, could be amended to provide for plans to protect, ration and deliver food from
both government and private sector stockpiles and provide plans for distribution in the
event of a national emergency. The Department of Homeland Security would act as the
lead agency responsible for coordination and dissemination of food assistance in
partnership with the Departments of Agriculture and Defense. Similarly, the distribution
of water would be challenging. Though water facilities are designed to be protected from
threats by terrorists and natural disasters, EMP is not currently listed as a threat
consideration for water treatment or distribution facilities. Lack of access to food and
water combined with limited access to transportation could result in civil disorder, such
as widespread looting and crime.
Though employment of nuclear EMP does not typically result in immediate
civilian casualties, weeks or months without proper access to food, water or electricity
could very well result in widespread civilian harm or death. Emergency services would
be in high-demand from the beginning of the crisis and throughout the recovery.
However, the technology relied upon by emergency personnel, such as mobile radio
communications equipment, commercial telephone networks and civil power networks, is
likely to be degraded or destroyed by EMP which would severely impact response time,
logistics and critical health operations. Increased demand for emergency services will
overwhelm any operational systems, introducing further complications.
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Government, Military and Space Assets
Maintaining continuity of government in the immediate aftermath of a crisis such
as EMP is priority number one. Secure communications between the President and senior
officials must remain intact in order to provide stability to the public and command
responsive actions if any are to be ordered. National capabilities were designed and
fielded during the Cold War but may need to be updated to reflect the complexity and
sophistication of today’s government and military structure. Current policy requires
protection from EMP effects on U.S. strategic forces and command and control81.
Certifying and maintaining the credibility of U.S. strategic forces is challenging and, as
observed by the Commission in 2004, EMP protections on such systems have
experienced “relaxed discipline”82; the survivability of U.S. nuclear forces in particular
may have become an “acceptable risk” post-Cold War83. However, for U.S. strategic
forces to contribute to deterrence of an EMP attack, the ability of forces to withstand
EMP effects and reliably respond or retaliate must be certified regularly and with public
acknowledgment.
U.S. general purpose forces are consistently technologically superior to those of
the vast majority of the world. Advanced warfighting and joint combat operations depend
upon technologically advanced computing, information flow and superior
communications, all of which are powered by advanced electronics and space-borne
assets. This highly superior technology is extremely vulnerable to the effects of EMP,
making them an attractive target for asymmetric deployment of nuclear weapons against
U.S. forces and infrastructure terrestrially and in space. Low-earth orbit satellites that
enable up- and down-link capabilities, GPS and PNT, remote sensing, weather
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forecasting, imaging, and other mission critical capabilities are politically, militarily and
economically valuable. They are also among the most vulnerable when it comes to
damage and destruction from EMP effects. The Commission to Assess National Security
Space Management and Organization cited low-earth orbiting satellites as particularly
vulnerable to “severe lifetime degradation or outright failure from collateral radiation
effects resulting from EMP attacks on ground targets”84. Without operable space assets,
the ability of the United States to operate in cross-domain operations, joint operations or
communicate in any meaningful way would be degraded to a significant degree, if not
made nearly impossible. Essentially, large swaths of the U.S. military would be operating
deaf and blind. While it is not practical to fund EMP protections on every military
capability, space assets such as satellite navigation systems, satellite and airborne
intelligence and targeting systems, and missile defense systems must be protected from
every level of EMP effect to ensure the continued operational capability of strategic
assets of the U.S. military at home and in theater. To implement EMP protections as
acquisition and design requirements for critical military assets, like space capabilities and
critical platforms, it will “require the personal involvement and cooperation of the
Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, the Service Chiefs, and the
appropriate congressional oversight committees”85.
In 2008, the EMP Commission released a second study on the critical
infrastructures of the United States, in which the Commission expressed serious doubts
that the U.S. federal government has “sufficiently robust capabilities for reliably
assessing and managing EMP threats. The country is rapidly losing the technical
competence needed”86 within the national labs, industry and government communities.
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Inaction may increase the EMP threat to the United States due to widespread and openly
available analysis showing that the United States is highly vulnerable to large-scale
attacks on electrical critical infrastructure. Without visible, publicly reported investments
that show a directed effort to protect infrastructure against EMP-style effects, adversarial
actors may be incentivized to take advantage of this critical U.S. vulnerability.
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CHAPTER 4: THE 2003 NORTHEAST BLACKOUT – A CASE STUDY
On August 14, 2003, in what utility officials called “a blink-of-the-eye second”87,
eight states in the Northeast and Midwestern United States, as well as Southeastern parts
of Canada, experienced electrical blackout after a power line sagging due to heat and
increased energy demand brushed against overgrown vegetation. The failure in the line
caused others in the same network to fail, which ultimately resulted in a “massive
outflow”88 of power as other lines and ground systems tried to cope with the extra energy.
Eventually, the overtaxed systems shut down and cascading failures began to result in
massive power failures across the larger grid. The effects of the blackout were
widespread and significant; in the course of an afternoon, more than 50 million people
were without power. Airports in the region experienced significant delays due to air
traffic control disruption, commuters on subway trains at the time of the blackout had to
be evacuated as trains were left stranded, and traffic lights remained out or blinking for
hours causing widespread gridlock. Telecommunications companies reported disruption
in service due to call volume compounded by failures at several cellular transmitters
reliant on electricity providers within the affected area. ATM’s and bank teller machines
were inoperable, leaving citizens without cash on hand unable to purchase flashlights,
batteries or other emergency supplies and incidents of looting were reported in downtown
New York City. Perhaps the most dangerous effect of the blackout was the loss of air
conditioning in the height of summer. Citizens vulnerable to the heat began to overflow
emergency rooms which were relying on emergency generators for power. Some reported
vehicle-related injuries due to traffic accidents and pedestrians being hit by cars. The
ability of emergency personnel to navigate dark and gridlocked streets to reach those in
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need was severely hampered. The stock exchange had closed for the day and was not
itself disrupted, though the economic impact of the blackout was later calculated to be
near $6 billion89.
Almost ten years later, in 2012, a report published in the journal Epidemiology
cited nearly 100 deaths that the blackout directly caused or contributed to. The study
found that 12 individuals perished due to accidents (vehicle or otherwise), 38 by
cardiovascular conditions (heart attacks, some triggered by panic), three from respiratory
problems (exacerbated asthma) and 37 from various other health conditions. The New
York City health department blamed six deaths on carbon monoxide poisoning due to the
blackout90. The study concluded that “power outages can immediately and severely harm
human health” 91, whether as a direct impact or a contributing factor.
The cause of the 2003 Northeast blackout, as determined by a comprehensive
report by the Department of Energy and the North American Electric Reliability
Corporation (NERC), was identified as long-term inadequacies within the system and
institutional failures and weaknesses resulting in widespread cascading failure. The report
separated the causes into four categories: failure to assess and understand the
inadequacies in the system, inadequate situational awareness, failure to keep vegetation
growth under control, and failure of organizations to provide real-time diagnostic
support.92 In simple terms, the 2003 blackout was a result of a single failure compounded
by human error and widespread system weaknesses.
Prior to the blackout, NERC set standards for the electrical grid system but they
were largely “administrative and technical rather than results-oriented” and represented
“minimum requirements that may be made more stringent if appropriate by regional or
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sub-regional bodies, but the regions have varied in their willingness to implement
exacting reliability standards”93. Without requirements codified by the Federal
Government, the industry created standards and best practices for itself that in many
cases were not adequately followed or inadequately communicated to operators
responsible for maintaining service, even under abnormal operating conditions.
Following the release of the report, Congress passed the Energy Policy Act of 2005,
which expanded the role of the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC), giving
the agency authority to approve and enforce energy industry standards and requirements.
These standards which were once voluntary, are now mandatory and legally enforceable.
Human error and lack of training also contributed to the blackout. At the station in
Ohio where the originating line came in contact with overgrown vegetation, an alarm
system designed to alert operators of problems had gone offline more than an hour before
the failure and no one in the control room had noticed. The failure of the alarm system
prevented operators from re-distributing power to less overloaded transmission lines.
Additionally, at the regional power facility in Indiana, a grid-monitoring computer
crashed. A technician was able to fix it but left for lunch and forgot to turn the computer
back on. Consequently, the regional power station was unable to collect data on issues
within the regional grid and their effect on other stations, and as such, could not monitor
or take action to prevent the cascading failures94. Once cascading failures begin, there is
little human intervention can do to stop them. The key in preventing or responding to
wide-scale energy failures is maintaining well-trained, prepared staff operators and
technicians who have practiced what to do in the event blackout conditions arise. The

54

report found that “significant additional training is needed to qualify an individual to
perform system operation and management functions”95.
The 2003 blackout lasted for just over two days, though some areas were able to
restore power in several hours. The blackout was widespread and disruptive, but not
long-lasting and did not severely impact communications capabilities or any capabilities
not directly attached to the grid. Independent electronics and vehicles were unharmed.
General civility among the population remained intact and widespread panic was
avoided. Blackouts like this are a good indicator of how systems typically recover from
widespread events and what is needed in terms of technology standards and human
intervention and training, but are not always a good measure of the enormity of an attack
like nuclear EMP.
First, the recovery period for an EMP crisis would be much longer and more
demanding. Unlike blackouts, the infrastructure in an EMP attack would not just be
damaged or offline but in some cases destroyed and not just state-by-state or regionally
but likely across multiple regions or, if the nuclear weapon is large enough, across the
majority of the country. Recovery time from an EMP attack would be exponentially
longer and the process more difficult. Replacing the power transmission infrastructure is
much more complicated than simply purchasing equipment or capabilities which were
destroyed. In many cases, equipment used in this grid is “specially produced and has to
be ordered from overseas… and generally takes two years to be manufactured and
delivered”96. Though transmission units outside of the affected area could begin to restart
others as they became repaired, this process would take weeks and gaps would occur
where stations were waiting on destroyed units to be replaced. Without protecting this
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critical infrastructure from EMP effects, the recovery time will be weeks at a very
minimum.
Second, the stability of communities and civilian populations is at far higher risk
of collapsing the longer a crisis extends. In longer-lasting recovery periods, communities
experience wide-spread looting, opportunism and vigilante civil defense. After disasters,
people expect help, and they expect it from federal, state and local governments working
in concert. Emotional reactions are compounded by the paralysis of government and
emergency services. In the 2003 blackout, civil order remained intact largely because
communications infrastructure was unaffected and civilians were largely successful in
contacting loved ones and getting information from federal and state officials. In an EMP
attack, the ability to do so in a widespread manner is highly unlikely. The first
requirement, and most stabilizing influence, in response to a disaster like EMP is the
dissemination of information to the public. The second is bringing back the ability of the
public to communicate with friends and loved ones they will be concerned about.
Third, and finally, the 2003 blackout affected the ability of state and local
emergency services to respond in a limited manner but did not affect the ability of the
United States military or government to function. Because the stock market was
unaffected, the financial viability of the country remained intact. Government agencies
were able to communicate and U.S. national security assets were not degraded or
prevented from performing critical missions. All of these critical capabilities are at risk in
the event of nuclear EMP. Blackouts rarely test the ability of the Federal Government to
protect national security interests and assets, beyond maintaining civil order, however it
is in the government’s interest to consider the effects of extended blackout in concert
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with communication infrastructure loss in national security terms. If the U.S. government
and military capabilities are unable to communicate with one another, instability among
government will be coupled with instability among the civilian population. Without
visible leadership, the credibility of the United States at home and as an international
actor will suffer immensely.
The 2003 blackout serves as a useful example of the kinds of effects the United
States may experience in the immediate aftermath of an EMP attack. No case study is
perfect, as this type of attack has never been perpetrated against a modern civilian
population. However, by piecing together examples of widespread outage or damage
caused by blackouts, severe weather events and terrorist attacks, important lessons can be
learned about what to expect, what may be needed to respond or recover and what can be
realistically and economically prevented. This kind of analysis also highlights the
vulnerabilities inherent within U.S. systems and policies of response, both of which are
well known to U.S. adversaries who wish harm against the United States – whether that
occurs in the form of nuclear EMP, cyber-attacks, terrorist attacks or other actions.
Up to this point, this analysis has focused on the effects of nuclear EMP, the
capabilities of U.S. adversaries to deliver it and the consequences for the United States
should one succeed. The following chapter will take this context and analyze how and
why identified adversaries may employ nuclear EMP, how this threat impacts deterrence
and what strategies the United States may be able to use to deter the employment of
nuclear EMP against the U.S. homeland and U.S. forces abroad.
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CHAPTER 5: THE UTILITY OF NUCLEAR EMP
The employment of a nuclear weapon with the intention of creating widespread
EMP effects is a viable option of attack for both state and non-state actors. The capability
to employ a nuclear weapon in this manner is available to existing nuclear weapon states
like Russia and China, rogue states like North Korea and Iran, as well as to terrorist
organizations who are able to acquire the capability either through purchase or, less
likely, through independent development. The fact remains, however, that employment of
a nuclear weapon is a serious action and the effort required to gain the ability to do so is
immense. For an actor to expel that amount of effort and to take on extreme political and
security risks, the utility of employment must be quite high. This chapter will explore the
motivations behind the employment of EMP and why it remains a viable option or goal
for adversaries of the United States in the 21st century environment.

Rogue States
The employment of WMD is attractive to rogue states like Iran and North Korea
because it provides them an asymmetric response to U.S. technological and conventional
superiority and complicates U.S. response options. Rogue states are most likely to
employ nuclear EMP as a battlefield component of an “escalate to de-escalate” strategy:
employ a nuclear weapon at high-altitude, in theater, to severely hamper the ability of
U.S. and allied forces to communicate, maneuver, recover or respond; or employ a
nuclear weapon at high-altitude above a U.S. ally or partner, creating a regional crisis and
forcing the United States to act or remain out of the conflict; or employ a small nuclear
weapon at high-altitude above the United States, demonstrating nuclear weapons
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capability, lowering U.S. resolve to respond or intervene in regional conflicts, and
impacting the ability of the United States to operate, in a limited manner.
The employment of WMD, or threat of employment, can be useful in influencing
the decisions or actions of U.S. allies. It is possible that rogue states would threaten the
employment of WMD against U.S. allies, friends or coalition members to frighten them
out of cooperation with the United States, either in the form of U.S. basing abroad or
political, military and economic support. The strategic goals of rogue states, such as
regime survival and regional hegemony, are most threatened by the presence and actions
of the United States military in the region.
However, experts today are in disagreement about where North Korea would most
likely employ nuclear EMP. While a “Taepo Dong-2 missile launched from North Korea
probably could deliver a warhead 300 miles above America, enough to degrade electronic
systems throughout the country,”97 this may guarantee an overwhelming response from
the United States that would devastate the North Korean regime. As a strategic option for
ending a regional conflict, this action by North Korea is highly unlikely and irrational 98.
There is little utility in perpetrating an attack against the U.S. homeland that would likely
result in the end of the North Korean regime, by the hands of the United States or its
allies. Far more likely, is the employment of a North Korean nuclear weapon in the
atmosphere above the Korean peninsula in an attempt to cripple U.S. and South Korean
military capabilities present in theater, possibly as a first step in a larger campaign. North
Korean technical capabilities are less likely to be affected by EMP (either through
protection or limited sophistication) and would remain operable enough to execute
military missions on the peninsula as U.S. and South Korean forces attempted to recover.
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However, if the North Korean regime were to perceive that it would not survive a
conflict, regardless of U.S. and allied response, it may very well decide to employ nuclear
EMP against the U.S. homeland as a final act in an attempt to bring the United States to
its knees.
Iran’s decision calculus for nuclear EMP is likely very similar. Iran’s desire to be
the reigning regional power in the Middle East is the driving force behind its missile and
nuclear programs. Without either, Iran’s ability to project power and influence the
regional security environment would be severely limited. Protecting the ability to
influence the security dynamics of the region and act as the pivotal regional power is
essential to maintaining control and to the survival of the Iranian regime as it currently
stands. Employment of nuclear EMP in theater would cripple any regional forces or
assets and would enable the regime to act decisively without the threat of intervention, by
the U.S. or another regional adversary. Israel has recognized the utility of this strategy
and has taken measures to protect its assets and capabilities against nuclear EMP in order
to maintain the ability to respond.99 The United States would be forced to make difficult
decisions about potential responses and policy moving forward. Unlike the environment
on the Korean peninsula, the United States would be facing a much more complex and
volatile security situation with far more chances for miscalculation.
Iran certainly possesses the ability to employ nuclear EMP against the U.S.
homeland but, similar to North Korea, has little reason to do so outside of dire
circumstances. The risk of an overwhelming response by the United States is much lower
if Iran were to employ nuclear EMP in theater. An “escalate to de-escalate” strategy is
much more likely to succeed if U.S. civilians and the homeland are unharmed, leaving

60

the United States’ interpretation of proportional response much narrower. However, if
Iran were to employ nuclear EMP against the United States homeland, an overwhelming
response, nuclear or conventional, is much more likely – even if the deployment of
conventional assets is more difficult; the risk-reward calculus is much more skewed. In
the case of both Iran and North Korea, the response of the international community to an
attack on the U.S. homeland, rather than the employment of nuclear EMP in a crisis or
battlefield scenario, would likely be swift and decisive. For two states who value survival
above all else, the risk of an attack of such magnitude against the United States at home is
far higher than the reward.

Terrorist Organizations
As demonstrated by the attacks of September 11th, “our enemies will seek to
attack in ways we are not prepared for, using methodologies that have not previously
been tried”100. Nuclear EMP represents a unique challenge and opportunity to terrorist
organizations. While it is difficult for terrorist organizations to acquire the technology
and materials needed to successfully execute a nuclear EMP attack, if executed
successfully, the event and its aftermath would be highly visible and widely covered.
Terrorist organizations like Al Qaeda and ISIL have publicly announced their desire for
WMD capabilities and include “using the technology of directed energy weapons or
EMP” as part of their information warfare campaigns101. The beauty of EMP for terrorist
organizations is its indiscriminate nature: the U.S. military is not the only entity severely
affected by EMP; the U.S. public relies on electronic systems that would also be severely
impacted, degraded or destroyed. While the non-discriminatory aspect of EMP may deter
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a state actor from using it against the U.S. homeland (making it more attractive as a
battlefield weapon), a terrorist may very well find great utility in it.
The national security community is divided on how sophisticated the technology
required to produce EMP effects must be and, as a result, which actors are capable of
employing nuclear EMP. One side believes the technical requirements of a nuclear
weapon capable of producing EMP are too sophisticated and as such, are a barrier to
terrorist acquisition and use; ultimately, they believe that a crude nuclear weapons
package will not produce the desired effects. The weapon must have a trigger
mechanism, electronics and complicated physics package as well as be compact enough
to fit onto a ballistic missile or other sophisticated missile system102. In their view, it is
highly unlikely that a terrorist organization could successfully steal these capabilities; yet
it is possible they could be purchased. Iran and North Korea are the most likely sellers of
ballistic missiles to terrorist organizations, however they are unlikely to do so after
spending significant money and time on their own programs while simultaneously
incurring political and security risks. The sale of nuclear material and technology is much
more difficult and monitored closely by the international community. Programs like
Cooperative Threat Reduction, international agencies like the International Atomic
Energy Agency and international communities, such as signatories to the Nuclear
Nonproliferation Treaty, ensure, to the best of their ability, that nuclear material does not
enter the hands of terrorist organizations. However, if a terrorist organization were able to
successfully purchase or steal a complete nuclear weapons package, fitting it onto a
missile it was not designed for would be equally technically challenging. For an
organization to be successful in both areas, it would need significant time, money and
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likely capable members or partners. However, cooperation with a terrorist organization,
especially for Iran, is not outside the realm of possibility, as it would complicate
attribution and pose significant challenges for the United States when determining
proportionate response. North Korea is less likely to engage in such activity, as they do
not have a long history of state-sponsored terrorism on a large-scale and keep a close
hold on their technological achievements. However, the other side of the community
argues that the barrier to employment of nuclear EMP is not as high as described here and
that EMP effects can be achieved with low-yield nuclear weapons, launched from
relatively unsophisticated missiles at close-range. As mentioned previously, all a missile
needs to do is go up. If a terrorist organization could, for example, launch a 10kt weapon
(the size believed to be in the North Korean nuclear arsenal) with a short-range missile
off the coast of the United States from a cargo or transportation ship, it would likely
succeed in producing EMP effects up and down the coast of the United States103.
While the challenges facing a terrorist organization in acquiring nuclear
technology and missile capabilities are daunting, they are not impossible to overcome.
Once a terrorist organization has acquired the necessary materials and technology, it is
unlikely to hold onto it for long. Terrorist use of WMD has long been on the agenda and
once acquired, the organization is unlikely to wait to employ it, for fear of losing it to
adversaries who locate it and deny their ability to employ it. Depending on the
organization, it may be far more useful to employ a crude nuclear device in a more
traditional terror attack, such as a truck bomb, than go through the effort to employ a
successful EMP attack. How a terrorist organization chooses to employ WMD depends
completely on desired effect. If an organization is willing to take a longer view, it may
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very well decide upon nuclear EMP due to the existential nature of the threat against the
United States.

Russia and China
Unlike rogue states and terrorist organizations, nuclear EMP fits into a larger asymmetric
strategy for nuclear weapon states, in this case Russia and China. As has been previously
discussed, nuclear EMP does not represent a stand-alone strategy for either of these
actors but enables a larger asymmetric strategy to succeed. Nuclear weapons still act as a
counter to the conventional superiority of the United States and will continue to do so in
relations between Russia and China and the United States. However, the utility of nuclear
EMP is in its ambiguity as to whether it is considered employment of a nuclear weapon in
the traditional sense and therefore, whether employment of nuclear EMP is considered a
crossing of the nuclear threshold. The nuclear EMP policies of Russia and China suggest
that these two states believe the risk the United States would view nuclear EMP as a
crossing of the nuclear threshold and respond with nuclear weapons is low104. The
Russian belief in this theory is so strong that they have in the past made threats of nuclear
EMP based on it: “In 1999, for example, at a high level meeting in Vienna of a
Congressional delegation with senior members of the Russian government, Vladimir
Lukin, the chairman of the Duma's Foreign Affairs Committee, angry with American
policy in the Balkans, issued the following threat: ‘If we really wanted to hurt you with
no fear of retaliation, we would launch a Submarine-launched Ballistic Missile (SLBM),
[and] we would detonate a nuclear weapon high above your country and shut down your
power grid’.”105
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Both Russia and China would benefit from a United States forced to retreat from the
global stage as it recovered from a devastatingly successful nuclear EMP attack. Russia
would emerge as the militarily superior power and China as the economic super power of
the world. Both would enjoy increased influence in their respective regions and face little
resistance to their expansionist strategies and territorial claims. Though NATO would
likely invoke Article 5 and attempt to respond to Russia, without the capabilities of the
United States, the alliance would struggle to match the military might of the Russian
Federation. The security environment in Europe would drastically change without the
deterrent effect of a NATO backed by U.S. nuclear capabilities. The Baltic States would
likely face a rapidly expansionist Russia and events like those witnessed in Crimea,
Ukraine in 2013 would be further enabled. China’s claims to islands in the South China
Sea would largely go unanswered and the security of South Korea, Japan and Taiwan
would lessen dramatically. In either case, it is likely that regional conflicts and crises
would break out with very limited U.S. aid or none at all. Though cooperation between
Russia and China in executing a nuclear EMP attack against the United States is highly
unlikely, one would certainly reap benefits from the action of the other. There is a high
likelihood that breakdowns in security in both regions would occur, regardless of who
perpetrated the attack. Russia and China recognize the opportunity nuclear EMP affords
them and has prepared their nuclear weapons and missile systems to be capable of
carrying it out. Through viewing nuclear EMP as an asymmetric capability, they increase
both the utility of it and the likelihood that it may be employed in today’s security
environment.
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Actor
Russia

Threat Level
Moderate

Target Region
U.S. Homeland

China

Moderate

Iran

Low

U.S. Homeland/In
Theater
In Theater

North Korea

Low

In Theater

Terrorist
Organization

Low

U.S. Homeland

Capability
High-yield NW, Ballistic
Missile
High-yield NW, Ballistic
Missile
Low-yield NW, Ballistic or
Cruise Missile
Low- or High-yield NW,
Ballistic or Cruise Missile
Low-yield NW, Crude
Ballistic or Cruise Missile

Table 1. Level of EMP Threat According to Actor
Nuclear EMP presents a unique opportunity to state and non-state actors alike.
While the threat of nuclear weapons employment against the U.S. homeland has been
reduced since the end of the Cold War, the utility of the employment of nuclear EMP has
risen dramatically. U.S. reliance on sophisticated electronics and technologically
advanced systems has created a vulnerability that now represents an existential threat to
the existence of the United States in its current form. No other threat facing the United
States in the 21st century security environment represents greater consequences,
regardless of its low likelihood. The following chapter analyzes how the threat of nuclear
EMP, as portrayed by the actors discussed here, impacts and challenges traditional
strategic deterrence and recommends the best deterrence strategies to reduce the risk of
employment or deter attack altogether.
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CHAPTER 6: NUCLEAR EMP AND DETERRENCE
Deterrence during the Cold War relied on the mutual understanding that nuclear
employment by one side would result in massive retaliation by the other. In the modern
warfare environment, massive retaliation has largely fallen by the wayside, replaced by
theories such as tailored deterrence, minimum deterrence and escalation control. The act
of deterring nuclear weapons employment includes more than the employment of nuclear
weapons in return but includes the ability to deny successful employment through
capabilities such as missile defense. As the deterrence picture became more complicated,
so did the threats. During the Cold War, nuclear EMP was a component of nuclear
employment, provoking the same result as detonating a nuclear weapon on enemy
territory. There was no daylight between the types of employment one could choose and
the response they received. The same is not true for today. Traditional approaches to
nuclear deterrence do not fully encompass or address the threat of nuclear
electromagnetic pulse. If the United States is to deter or deny the employment of nuclear
EMP against its homeland and forces and allies abroad, it must take current deterrence
policy and shape it to specifically address this threat, regardless of who poses it.
The 2004 EMP Commission began its analysis with upfront recommendations,
one of the first of which was to determine and develop a deterrence strategy designed to
counter the threat posed by nuclear EMP106, which would then be supplemented by
improvements in the protections of U.S. critical infrastructure systems and U.S. military
assets. As discussed in previous chapters, a tangible step the United States can take in
deterring an EMP attack is investing in physical protections of U.S. critical infrastructure,
including key transmission lines in the electrical grid, U.S. space assets (military and
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commercial), and strategic nuclear forces. As spending on nuclear weapons declined, so
did “budgets for programs to harden key satellite, communications and other critical
nuclear and non-nuclear supporting equipment and facilities to the effects of nuclearinduced electromagnetic pulse…the failure to spend funds to maintain the hardness
against EMP…may be compounded by our increasing reliance on commercial off-theshelf technology. … If nuclear weapons and supporting systems, such as the systems that
warn of a missile attack, do not survive or do not operate as planned, they will not
support robust and flexible deterrence”107. The United States can also conduct training
exercises designed to train civilian and military personnel at all levels of critical
infrastructure how to recognize an EMP attack and what to do in the immediate
aftermath. Doing so in a deliberate and public manner will not only heighten U.S.
consciousness of the threat and prepare both civilian and military agencies for
emergencies, but lower the level of high-consequence risk to the United States and make
an EMP attack less attractive to adversaries. Reduced consequences have a direct
correlation in reducing risk and probability of attack. Additionally if the United States
can protect civilian and military assets in a meaningful way, the risk of delayed response
due to distraction by the level of devastation at home is far less and would contribute to a
credible threat of response. In fact, not investing in such protections, may incentivize an
adversary to choose nuclear EMP as a course of action due to their belief that the United
States would be blindsided and further incapacitated.
U.S. national security strategies over the years have contributed indirectly to the
deterrence of nuclear EMP and the defense of the nation and its allies through taking
actions to strengthen alliances to defeat terrorism and strengthen and enforce counter-
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proliferation and non-proliferation regimes, both independently and as part of global
partnerships108. These actions contribute significantly to the deterrence of terrorist
acquisition of a nuclear weapon or sophisticated missile technology, but do little to deter
the employment of nuclear EMP once already acquired. The same national security
strategies have called for increased ballistic missile defense and global precision strike
capabilities, both of which increase the ability of the United States to defend against
incoming missile threats to the homeland but do little to deter employment of nuclear
EMP. Currently, the only missile defense system capable of intercepting and destroying a
missile exo-atmospherically is the Terminal High-Altitude Area Defense (THAAD)
system. THAAD has only successfully demonstrated the capability to destroy missiles
outside the Earth’s atmosphere twice109, one of which was a Medium-range ballistic
missile. While this is an achievement in missile defense technology, its contribution to
the deterrence of nuclear EMP is less significant. U.S. missile defense systems would
need to identify a missile as intended for nuclear EMP and intercept and destroy it prior
to its exit from Earth’s atmosphere, where it would be designed to detonate for maximum
EMP effect. To contribute in a significant way to deterrence or defense against nuclear
EMP, THAAD would be required to work far more often and at a much earlier stage than
it is currently designed. The capabilities of U.S. missile defenses simply “remain
uncertain at best”110 and do not address the technical challenges of defending against
high-altitude nuclear detonations.
Tangible protection measures, specialized training, international efforts to prevent
technology and material transfer, and kinetic defenses all contribute to the defense and
deterrence of nuclear EMP but do not lower risk to an acceptable level on their own.
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These measures must be supplemented by a strong deterrence strategy. Lawrence
Freedman, the prolific thinker on deterrence strategy, wrote in 2004 that deterrence “in
all cases is about setting boundaries for actions and establishing the risks associated with
the crossing of those boundaries…During the Cold War…the study of deterrence became
synonymous with the study of the strategic conduct of the Cold War. The confrontation
defined the concept rather than the concept the confrontation”111. In the case of nuclear
EMP, the current view of the United States is much the same; the confrontation defines
the concept of deterrence, rather than deterrence of the confrontation defining the
landscape in which it exists. To ignore the landscape out of which the threat emanates is
to ignore the reasons behind why actors would choose to employ nuclear EMP in the first
place. With these reasons understood, the United States must now create a strategy of
deterrence that defines the confrontation of nuclear EMP.
For a credible deterrence strategy to be formed around the issue of nuclear EMP,
the United States must first be willing to unambiguously designate the employment of a
nuclear weapon to achieve EMP effects as a crossing of the nuclear threshold. Doing so
upends the strategic calculus of adversaries like Russia, China, Iran and North Korea who
believe that the United States may not classify it as such and as a result, may exercise
restraint in response112. Strategic ambiguity does not serve the United States well when it
comes to the threat of nuclear EMP, mainly due to the fact that the very ability of the
United States to respond may be hampered by the effects of the attack itself. Strategic
nuclear forces will likely survive, and depending on the location of the detonation,
regional assets are likely to as well. Though the United States may choose not to respond
with a nuclear weapon detonation on the perpetrators territory, it must remain a clear and
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viable option. The nature of U.S. employment of a nuclear weapon in response - whether
it be a high-altitude detonation over the perpetrators territory, a low-yield, tactical ground
burst, or an air-burst targeting military assets – can remain ambiguous, but the United
States must be willing to maintain the long-held policy that an action crossing the nuclear
threshold will incur a proportionate and necessary response. As Freedman writes, “when
using deterrence to defend an interest, it is necessary not only to demonstrate how
deterrence will work if challenged but also the nature of the interest to be defended”113.
Nuclear EMP, as an existential threat, threatens the greatest security interest of the United
States: to maintain the security of the homeland, the safety of U.S. citizens and the role of
the United States in the world as a leading democratic power.
Establishing a declaratory policy that outlines the employment of nuclear EMP as
a violation of the nuclear threshold allows the United States to then tailor the strategy to
address the two aspects of the threat: deter employment of EMP in theater and deter
employment of EMP against the U.S. homeland. Unlike the strategic nuclear deterrence
strategies used today to deter nuclear employment in more traditional ways, deterrence
strategies for EMP need not be tailored by actor but by employment scenario. The results
for the actor who chooses to employ nuclear EMP should be largely the same, regardless
of who the actor may be. For North Korea and Iran, those results likely mean the end of
their regime – which speaks to their greatest strategic interest. For states like Russia and
China, those results mean devastating response on their homeland with the risk of
triggering a large-scale conflict that is outside of their interests and does not achieve the
strategic goal they hoped to through employment of nuclear EMP. Terrorist
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organizations, however, are a different animal altogether and must be considered
separately.
Additionally, any strategy designed to deter nuclear EMP must maintain the
freedom of the United States to respond across domains. Should an adversary employ
nuclear EMP with the intention of solely targeting U.S. space assets (though the physics
of a high-altitude nuclear detonation would likely result in effects terrestrially as well),
the United States should be clear in its declaratory policy that it maintains the freedom
and capability to respond to the perpetrator both in space and on earth. Due to the fact
that rules of engagement in space are not established and norms of weapons in space are
increasingly challenged, the risk of nuclear EMP employment specifically designed to
effect space assets is rising. In creating a strong policy on responses to nuclear EMP in
space, the United States may well lead the way in establishing deterrence norms about the
weaponization of the space domain, which in turn complicates the risk calculus for actors
looking to exploit vulnerabilities in space and enhances terrestrial deterrence strategies.
Though deterring nuclear EMP against the U.S. homeland is priority number one,
the likelihood of nuclear EMP employment is far higher in theater because the utility in
an “escalate to de-escalate” strategy is greater. Deterring an actor from employing a
nuclear weapon at high-altitude above a conflict zone not only requires the credible
capability of U.S. and allied forces to survive enough to respond quickly and in kind, but
requires a declaratory policy that is detailed and clear in its approach to response. The
United States must credibly convince the actor that crossing the nuclear threshold with
the employment of EMP would not only prompt devastating U.S. action against the
regime’s homeland in the form of targeted nuclear response against military assets, such
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as identified nuclear weapons facilities (ensuring the inability to launch additional
nuclear weapons), but overwhelming conventional response as well.
Deterrence of the employment of nuclear EMP against the U.S. homeland looks
slightly different because the intended effects are different, are intended to occur on a
much larger scale and impact the U.S. civilian population in significant and potentially
long-lasting ways. The ability of the United States to credibly deny an adversary the
capabilities or chance to employ nuclear EMP against the United States is much more
important in this scenario than it is in theater. U.S. nonproliferation and counterproliferation efforts will go a long way in denying adversaries like Iran, North Korea and
terrorist organizations the ability to acquire sophisticated enough technology to launch a
nuclear EMP attack from their own territory. Denying their ability to launch an attack
from a mobile position, such as a freight cargo ship in the oceans off the coast of the
United States, is much more difficult and depends upon international cooperation in
intelligence and interdiction efforts. Improved homeland missile defenses with the
capability to monitor and destroy missile threats before they exit Earth’s atmosphere and
hardened, survivable space assets (both civilian and military) would also contribute to
credible denial efforts for actors like Russia and China who would not be affected by
efforts to control technology and materials.
The key in deterring nuclear EMP against the U.S. homeland is in convincing an
actor that their attempt at crippling the United States will either not be as effective as
intended or will not succeed at all. The greater the survivability of the United States, the
greater the chance of instant and overwhelming response, therefore making the risk
greater than the potential reward. If the United States can succeed in credibly defending
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the capabilities needed to respond to a nuclear EMP attack, such as strategic nuclear
weapon systems, communications, and command and control, then an aggressive
declaratory policy in which nuclear employment is not a last resort is much more
effective; this of course does not mean that an overwhelming conventional response
would not be seen as proportional. However, the United States should make clear that
self-deterrence will not be a consideration in response to nuclear EMP attacks against the
U.S. homeland, eliminating any doubt that the United States would be unwilling to
respond to a nuclear non-casualty event with nuclear weapons.
The act of deterring a terrorist organization from employing nuclear EMP is more
difficult, though not impossible. Declaratory policy and threats against the “homeland” of
a terrorist organization are less effective because terrorist organizations are often located
amongst innocent civilian populations and within the borders of sovereign nations, who
may or may not have been involved or complicit in an attack. In the case of terrorist
employment of EMP, self-deterrence is a serious consideration on the part of the United
States. That being said, terrorism and terrorist employment of WMD is not an abstract
concept to U.S. national security experts and planners. If those same experts can be
convinced of the reality of nuclear EMP as a threat to the U.S. homeland, that is likely a
community that can galvanize efforts to protect critical infrastructure against the threat.
As Freedman explains, “the argument that deterrence does not work with terrorism can be
challenged, not because for every terrorist challenge a sure-fire form of deterrence can be
devised, but because over time it becomes apparent that this is a threat for which the
community has made adequate provision to the point where, even if some attacks
succeed, little of political consequence will follow and those responsible can expect they
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will be hunted down and punished”114. In this same vein, if the United States can
convince state actors, like Iran, that their sponsorship or aid of a terrorist organization in
acquiring nuclear EMP capabilities will be treated with the same severity of response as
those who perpetrated the attack itself, the United States may be successful in deterring
terrorist acquisition of EMP capabilities in the first place. However, proportional
response means little to a terrorist organization who already has the capability and threats
of U.S. nuclear employment against them are neither very credible nor realistic. Instead,
strategies of containment and disruption are most likely to prevent a terrorist organization
from acquiring the necessary capability and strategies of prevention and denial are most
effective in convincing a terrorist organization that nuclear EMP will not succeed in
achieving their goals. Though terrorist employment of WMD in less sophisticated ways,
such as crude bombs in trucks or pressure cookers, would be devastating, it would be far
less consequential for the United States in the long-term than an effective nuclear EMP
attack.
Nuclear EMP poses a unique deterrence challenge for the United States, a country
which has typically relied upon traditional strategic deterrence strategies to deter highend nuclear employment and large-scale conventional conflict. Nuclear EMP in the 21st
century, while still employment of a nuclear weapon, exists in an inherently different
threat realm as an asymmetric tool. It is for this reason, and the potential crippling impact
on U.S. capabilities, that nuclear EMP represents such an attractive option to U.S.
adversaries. The United States must recognize this fact and shift its own thinking
regarding the utility of nuclear EMP for a range of adversaries. In doing so, the United
States will not only increase its own understanding of strategic deterrence in the 21st
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century but also begin to effectively deter threats and defend the U.S. homeland, U.S.
allies and friends from actions that threaten to alter the security landscape for years to
come.
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CONCLUSION
The United States has faced a myriad of threats since those first nuclear weapons
tests in 1962 exhibited electromagnetic pulse effects, from all-out nuclear war to
terrorism to regional conflict. It is highly unusual that a threat of an era long thought over
would return to be more salient than it was at its inception. However, as the United States
became increasingly reliant on technology and advances in communications, energy
technology, transportation, electronics and military capabilities proliferated, a
vulnerability – an invisible Achilles heel – presented itself. Adversaries of the United
States did not walk away from the Cold War era in the same way the United States did
and they learned different lessons from the capabilities and strategies of those decades.
The United States developed strategies dependent upon its ability to assert its military
dominance, enabled by capabilities like precision strike and advances in communications
and electronics. These capabilities and the technology that enables them, are the Achilles
heel adversaries seek to exploit.
While the United States attempted to reduce reliance on nuclear weapons, they
became increasingly valuable to actors who could never compete with conventionally
superior adversaries. The United States, in many ways, became intellectually lazy in its
assessment of adversary motivations, capabilities and intentions. These trends have
contributed to the complex security environment of today, one in which the United States
finds itself existentially vulnerable to a threat it doesn’t believe is there in any meaningful
way. This is reflective of the kind of thinking that precipitated the attacks of September
11, 2001: a lack of creativity and out-of-the-box thinking that results in almost willful
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blindness to credible, potentially devastating threats that, once they occur, change the
fundamental fabric of the nation.
As discussed and analyzed in the pages here, the United States has the tools to
prevent or deter this threat, if it is willing to acknowledge it. The following are
recommendations for the United States government and its friends and allies to best deter
and prevent the unthinkable from becoming reality:
1. Immediately invest in the protection of critical infrastructure, especially those that
would take the longest to repair or replace (Large turbines, generators, highvoltage transformers, key regional electrical grid stations, air traffic control, water
filtration and distribution centers, government communications, command and
control, critical components of the financial industry, and perhaps most
importantly, space assets – especially low-earth orbit satellites, both commercial
and military). Some individual U.S. states have begun to invest in their own
protections against EMP. Maine, Virginia and Arizona have all passed their own
laws about hardening against EMP. Florida has established a Cyber and EMP
Legislative working group115. The Federal Government can follow by expanding
the National Cybersecurity and Critical Infrastructures Act of 2014 to include
threats from nuclear EMP and implementing the recommendations of the EMP
Commission reports as well as the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review.
2. Publicly classify employment of a nuclear weapon to create EMP effects as an act
that crosses the nuclear threshold, no exceptions.
3. Develop a sophisticated and specific deterrence strategy for EMP attacks against
the U.S. homeland and EMP attacks in theater. Conduct studies to determine the
utility and impact of ambiguity on deterrence of nuclear EMP116.
4. Specifically identify nuclear EMP as a threat in publicly released policy and
strategy documents, such as the National Security Strategy, Quadrennial Defense
Reviews, National Planning Scenarios, etc. Send a signal to adversaries that this
threat does not go unnoticed by the U.S. government. Lay the groundwork for
contributing to deterrence and denial.
5. Improve U.S. cross-domain capabilities. Actively participate in exercises
independently and with allies demonstrating cross-domain operational
capabilities.
6. Strengthen partnerships with U.S. allies and friends to improve intelligence and
interdiction of nuclear material and ballistic missile technology.
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7. Seek to improve U.S. missile defense capabilities to recognize and deny nuclear
EMP attacks.
8. Define the responsibilities of the Federal Government, state and local
governments and the private sector in recovering from an EMP attack against the
U.S. homeland. Equip and train individuals and agencies to respond specifically
to EMP effects. As of 2008, the EMP Commission was unable to convince the
Department of Homeland Security to include an EMP attack as one of the
National Planning Scenarios117; this should be priority number one in terms of
equipping federal agencies with responsibilities and action items in the event of a
nuclear EMP attack.
9. Continue to fund, for the next five to ten years, the Congressional EMP
Commission which was re-established in the 2016 National Defense
Authorization Act. Require reports on the study requirements as laid out in the
NDAA, including the vulnerability of U.S. military systems; the evolving current
and future threat; new technologies, procedures and contingency planning efforts
to protect against EMP; priorities for protection in each U.S. state; and the degree
of vulnerabilities in cascading failures118. Expand the study requirements to
include a study of the deterrence requirements and strategies that may be
employed against the threat of nuclear EMP for each actor capable of executing
the threat.
The United States remains the pre-eminent military power in the world and
continues to lead the way in technological advancements. As the security environment
becomes more complex, U.S. leadership will continue to play a role in creating a safer
world for many across the globe. To ignore capabilities and intentions that threaten that
role, not to mention the lives of its citizens and military personnel, is to ignore the
fundamental responsibilities and values the United States has for so long upheld. The
threat of nuclear EMP is real, present and clear. It is long past time the United States take
action to mitigate this threat and modernize its approach to deterrence in the 21st century.
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